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Focusing on Substantive Law in
International Economic Relations:
The Public Morals of GATT's Article




World trade and "public morals" are closely intertwined -
sometimes they form a homogeneous congeniality, sometimes
they lead to troublesome contradictions. Recent instances
where the two have clashed are easily at hand, such as import
prohibitions on pornographic products' and import restrictions
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1. This problem was recently discussed with special regard to child porn-
ography. See Judith Matloff, As Porn Proliferates, South Africa Debates Free
Speech, THE CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MON., Aug. 8, 1997, at 5.
The "import" of child pornography via the Internet could also appear to be a
problem with regard to the GATT, assuming the information which is being
downloaded is a product. The GATT (or GATS if the pornography is considered
to be a service) does not provide effective measures which could tackle this prob-
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on fur harvested by leg-hold traps.2 Other instances where
global trade and public morals do not necessarily correspond in-
clude import restrictions on products made in countries where
child labor is permitted 3 or where basic workers' rights are de-
nied,4 and the debate over import bans on cloned animals. 5
These examples show that, although world trade and its liberali-
zation6 are designed to promote the economic growth and wealth
of states, they sometimes may not coincide with the "public
morals" of participating states. When this occurs, Article XX(a)
of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) specifi-
cally provides that a state may deviate from a GATT obligation
when compliance with the obligation offends the state's public
morals.7 In other words, rather than breaching its obligation
lem and which could easily be enforced, because Internet access does not corre-
spond to national borders and thus it is nearly impossible to close national
markets to Internet-distributed goods and services.
2. EP Adopts Resolution on Leg-hold Traps, THE REUTER EUROPEAN COM-
MUNITY REP., Feb. 25, 1997, available in LEXIS, CURNWS File; David Fox, S.
Africa Trade, Animal Traps Top EU Meeting, THE REUTER EUROPEAN COMMU-
NITY REP., Feb. 23, 1997, available in LEXIS, CURNWS File; Caroline Southey
& Nancy Dunne, Fur Flies in Trapping Row, FIN. TIMES, Dec. 9, 1996, at 6.
3. See Steven Greenhouse, Sweatshop Raids Cast Doubt on an Effort by
Garment Makers to Police the Factories, N.Y. TIMES, July 18, 1997, at A10.
In addition see Paul De Waart, Minimum Labour Standards in Interna-
tional Trade from a Legal Perspective, in CHALLENGES TO THE NEW WORLD
TRADE ORGANIZATION 245, 260 (Pitou van Dijck & Gerrit Faber eds., 1996);
Timothy A. Glut, Note, Changing the Approach to Ending Child Labor: An In-
ternational Solution to an International Problem, 28 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L.
1203 (1995).
4. See Raymond Torres, Labour Standards and Trade, OECD OBSERVER,
Oct./Nov. 1996, at 10.
5. See Michael Specter & Gina Kolata, After Decades and Many Missteps,
How Cloning Succeeded, N.Y. TIMES, March 3, 1997, at Al, B6-B8; Larry Tye,
Small Firms Flock to Profit off Path Opened by Cloned Sheep, BOSTON GLOBE,
Feb. 26, 1997, at Al, A4. See also British Nobel Laureate Rotblat Warns
Against Cloning Peril, DEUTSCHE PRESSE-AGENTUR, Feb. 25, 1997, available in
LEXIS, CURNWS File; Caryn James, A Warning As Science Catches Up On
Cloning, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 26, 1997, at C9, C12.
6. World trade has strongly expanded in the past decades, see WORLD
TRADE ORGANIZATION, INTERNATIONAL TRADE, TRENDS AND STATISTICS § 1
(1995).
7. Article XX reads as follows:
General Exceptions
Subject to the requirement that such measures are not applied in
a manner which would constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable
discrimination between countries where the same conditions prevail,
or a disguised restriction on international trade, nothing in this Agree-
ment shall be construed to prevent the adoption or enforcement by any
contracting party of measures:
(a) necessary to protect public morals;
(b) necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or health;
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under GATT, a contracting party in this situation may invoke an
Article XX(a) exception. However, since standards of "public
morals" could differ among participating states, an interpreta-
tion of these standards must be found which can be consistently
shared among all GATT members.
In theory, Article XX(a)'s exception is designed to allow a
nation to participate in the international trading regime under
the World Trade Organization (WTO), while preserving certain
aspects of its national sovereignty over its domestic political and
(c) relating to the importation or exportation of gold or silver;
(d) necessary to secure compliance with laws or regulations which
are not inconsistent with the provisions of this Agreement, including
those relating to customs enforcement, the enforcement of monopolies
operated under paragraph 4 of Article II and Article XVII, the protec-
tion of patents, trade marks, and copyrights, and the prevention of de-
ceptive practices;
(e) relating to the products of prison labor;
(f) imposed for the protection of national treasures of artistic, his-
toric or archaeological value;
(g) relating to the conservation of exhaustible natural resources if
such measures are made effective in conjunction with restrictions on
domestic production or consumption;
(h) undertaken in pursuance of obligations under any intergovern-
mental commodity agreement which conforms to criteria submitted to
the CONTRACTING PARTIES and not disapproved by them or which
is itself so submitted and not so disapproved;*
(i) involving restrictions on exports of domestic materials neces-
sary to ensure essential quantities of such materials to a domestic
processing industry during periods when the domestic price of such
materials is held below the world price as part of a governmental stabi-
lization plan; Provided that such restrictions shall not operate to in-
crease the exports of or the protection afforded to such domestic
industry, and shall not depart from the provisions of this Agreement
relating to non-discrimination;
(j) essential to the acquisition or distribution of products in general
or local short supply; Provided that any such measures shall be consis-
tent with the principle that all contracting parties are entitled to an
equitable share of the international supply of such products, and that
any such measures, which are inconsistent with the other provisions of
this Agreement shall be discontinued as soon as the conditions giving
rise to them have ceased to exist. The CONTRACTING PARTIES shall
review the need for this sub-paragraph not later than 30 June 1960.
Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade
Negotiations, Apr. 15, 1994, THE REsuLTs OF THE URUGUAY ROUND OF MULTI-
LATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS: THE LEGAL TEXTS (1994), art. XX [hereinafter
GATT 1994].
The scope of Article XX is clarified by its Ad Article:
Sub-paragraph (h)
The exception provided for in this sub-paragraph extends to any com-
modity agreement which conforms to the principles approved by the
Economic and Social Council in its resolution 30 (IV) of 28 March 1947.
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legal order.8 GATT contains several provisions to safeguard
against those obligations that could greatly impinge upon states'
sovereignty. 9 For instance, Article XXI provides that a con-
tracting party may act in contravention with its obligations
under GATT when those actions are necessary for the protection
of its essential security interests. 10 Article XX(a) and its prom-
ise to effectively protect a state's sovereignty against intrusive
GATT obligations does not, therefore, raise any prima facie legal
problems.
In practice, though, the ambiguous and rather obscure
wording of Article XX(a) invites possible misuse. If construed
narrowly, Article XX(a) opens up a legal quagmire, in which
states' national sovereignty could easily vanish. Conversely, an
excessively broad reading of Article XX(a) could lead to numer-
ous invocations of the exceptions clause by individual states,
which could call into question both the legitimacy of individual
GATT provisions and GATT's rule of law as a whole.
This Article examines Article XX(a)'s status as an attempt
to navigate between Scylla and Charybdis. It focuses on the in-
terpretation of the term "public morals" at the intersection of
desired national sovereignty and required international uni-
formity. Part I traces the evolution of GATT to the WTO, with
special regard to the dispute settlement procedure and the role
of Article XX within trade disputes. Part II outlines the stan-
dards of interpretation established in the Vienna Convention on
the Law of Treaties. Furthermore, it prepares the ground for a
"conventional" interpretation of Article XX(a) by examining the
8. For an examination of the effect of the international economic market-
place on a nation's domestic markets, see JOHN H. JACKSON, RESTRUCTURING
THE GATT SYSTEM 1 (1990) [hereinafter RESTRUCTURING]; DAVID VOGEL, TRAD-
ING UP: CONSUMER AND ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION IN A GLOBAL ECONOMY 1-8
(1995); John H. Jackson, Reflections on International Economic Law, 17 U. PA.
J. INT'L ECON. L. 17 (1996). For discussion of this concept in GATT Panel re-
ports, see John H. Jackson,WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding-Misun-
derstandings on the Nature of Legal Obligation, 91 AM. J. INT'L L. 60, 62, 64
(1997) [hereinafter WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding].
9. For a list of pertinent provisions, see JoHN H. JACKSON, WORLD TRADE
AND THE LAW OF GATT 537-40 (1969).
For an examination of the dispute resolution mechanism of GATT in this
context, see Samuel C. Straight, Note, GATT and NAFTA: Marrying Effective
Dispute Settlement and the Sovereignty of the Fifty States, 45 DUKE L.J. 216
(1995).
10. GATT art. XXI. See also William J. Davey, The WTO/GATT World
Trading System: An Overview, in HANDBOOK OF WTO/GATT DISPUTE SETTLE-
MENT 63-64 (Pierre Pescatore, William J. Davey, Andreas F. Lowenfeld eds.,
Release June 1996).
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applicable methods of interpretation and by addressing extra-
provisional problems of Article XX(a) which were raised by re-
cent GATT panel reports. Part III exclusively and strictly uses
the "conventional" rules of interpretation, as set forth in the Vi-
enna Convention, to interpret the term "public morals." Finally,
Part IV concludes that only strict compliance with these rules
can provide predictability with respect to Article XX(a) in partic-
ular, as well as the Dispute Settlement System in general,
which is intended to solve trade disputes into the next century.
I. THE EVOLUTION OF GATT AND THE FORMATION OF
A SUPRANATIONAL ECONOMIC LEGAL ORDER
The dynamics of international trade after the Second World
War required a multilateral approach to coordinate economic
growth between prosperous and impoverished nations.11 Inter-
national trade provided an important means by which to pre-
serve world peace and develop interaction between previously
hostile nations. 12 The success of this approach is embodied in
the evolution from the General Agreement to the World Trade
Organization, which is briefly described in Section A. Section B
focuses on the dispute settlement system, which is the most im-
portant feature of this supranational economic legal order. Fi-
nally, Section C examines the specific role and meaning of
Article XX in trade disputes.
A. FROM THE GENERAL AGREEMENT TO THE WTO
On October 30, 1947, twenty-three contracting parties
signed the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). 13
Eight of the signatory states agreed to provisionally apply GATT
beginning January 1, 1948.14 This multilateral agreement
11. See generally JACKSON, supra note 9, at 36-41 (describing the initia-
tives for economic cooperation immediately after the Second World War).
12. ERNST-ULRICH PETERSMANN, CONSTITUTIONAL FUNCTIONS AND CONSTI-
TUTIONAL PROBLEMS OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW 49-72 (1991); Thomas R.
Howell & Alan W. Wolff, The Role of Trade Law in the Making of Trade Policy,
in INTERNATIONAL TRADE POLICY: THE LAWYER'S PERSPECTIVE 3-9 to 3-14 (John
H. Jackson et al. eds., 1985). See also OLIVIER LONG, LAW AND ITS LIMITATIONS
IN THE GATT MULTILATERAL TRADE SYSTEM 61-64 (1985) (describing the even-
tual balance between the legal approach and pragmatism).
13. WILLIAM A. BROWN, THE UNITED STATES AND THE RESTORATION OF
WORLD TRADE, AN ANALYSIS AND APPRAISAL OF THE ITO CHARTER AND THE GEN-
ERAL AGREEMENT ON TARIFFS AND TRADE 7 (1950).
14. Protocol of Provisional Application 55 U.N.T.S. 308 (1947). See gener-
ally JOHN H. JACKSON, THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM 35 (1989) (describing the
provisional application of GATT).
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aimed to facilitate customs treatment of imported products be-
tween signatories by creating schedules with specified customs
treatment. 15
The negotiations for the General Agreement occurred at the
same time the Charter for an International Trade Organization
was being developed. In 1945, the United States and Great Brit-
ain simultaneously published the first proposal for an Interna-
tional Trade Organization to expand world trade and
employment after the Second World War.16 Based on this pro-
posal and a charter suggested by the United States,17 a Prepara-
tory Committee of the United Nations Conference on Trade and
Employment and a Drafting Committee of technical experts
codified draft conventions in London18 and New York.19 In a
second session, the Preparatory Committee held conferences in
Geneva; its work finally culminated in another draft charter.20
On March 24, 1948, the United Nations Conference on Trade
and Employment concluded the Final Act and drafted the Ha-
vana Charter for an International Trade Organization. 21 The
Charter was a multilateral treaty with a large number of techni-
cal provisions, and stipulated the orderly conduct of interna-
tional economic relations. 22 The Charter also proposed an
international organization through which the member states
would work co-operatively in pursuit of the Charter's principles
and objectives. 23
On April 28, 1949, President Truman submitted the text of
the Charter to the two houses of Congress, which failed to ap-
15. BROWN, supra note 13, at 7; CLAIR WILCOX, A CHARTER FOR WORLD
TRADE 46 (1949).
16. U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, Pub. No. 2411, PROPOSALS FOR EXPANSION OF
WORLD TRADE AND EMPLOYMENT (Nov. 1945) [hereinafter U.S. Proposals].
17. Report of the First Session of the Preparatory Committee, U.N. Confer-
ence on Trade and Employment, U.N. Doc. E/PC/T/33 (Oct. 1946) [hereinafter
U.S. Draft Charter].
18. Report of the First Session of the Preparatory Committee, U.N. Confer-
ence on Trade and Employment, U.N. Doc. E/PC/T/33 (Oct. 1946) [hereinafter
London Draft Charter].
19. Report of the Drafting Committee of the Preparatory Committee, U.N.
Conference on Trade and Employment, U.N. Doc. E/PC/T/34/Rev.1 (Jan. 20 to
Feb. 25, 1947) [hereinafter New York Draft Charter].
20. Report of the Second Session of the Preparatory Committee, U.N. Con-
ference on Trade and Employment, U.N. Doc. E/PCIT/186 (Sept. 10, 1947)
[hereinafter Geneva Draft Charter].
21. Final Act and Related Documents, U.N. Conference on Trade and Em-
ployment, U.N. Doc. E/Conf. 2/78 (March 1948) [hereinafter Havana Charter].
22. BROWN, supra note 13, at 8; WILCOX, supra note 15, at 53.
23. BROWN, supra note 13, at 8; WILCOX, supra note 15, at 53.
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prove the Charter.24 Without the participation of the United
States, the other nations were not willing to accept the Char-
ter.25 Thus, the Charter never came into force and the provi-
sionally applied General Agreement became the "primary
mechanism for coordinating global trade policy for the next half-
century,"26 even though it lacked a real institutional and struc-
tural framework. Since then, the contracting parties have held
seven rounds of negotiations, in which they have reduced tariff
bindings27 and addressed the more recent problem of non-tariff
barriers. 28 The last of these rounds resulted in the creation of
the WTO Agreement, which became effective on January 1,
1995.29
This Agreement established the World Trade Organization,
an institutional and procedural framework which coordinates
economic relations between its member states. 30 The Agree-
ment itself has four annexes, including the General Agreement
on Tariffs and Trade 1994 (GATT 1994) and the Understanding
24. BROWN, supra note 13, at 10.
25. JACKSON, supra note 14, at 34; John H. Jackson et al., Implementing
the Tokyo Round: Legal Aspects of Changing International Economic Rules, 81
MICH. L. REV. 267, 270 (1982); Philip M. Nichols, GATT Doctrine, 36 VA. J. INT'L
L. 379, 390 (1996).
26. Nichols, supra note 25, at 390.
27. See Judith Hippler Bello, The WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding:
Less is More, 90 AM. J. INT'L L. 416, 417 (1996).
28. See, e.g., JOAN E. TwiGGs, THE TOKYO ROUND OF MULTILATERAL TRADE
NEGOTIATIONS 59-74 (1987); WILLIAM R. CLINE ET AL., TRADE NEGOTIATIONS IN
THE TOKYO RouND 145, 189 (1978); Frieder Roessler, Diverging Domestic Poli-
cies and Multilateral Trade Integration, in 2 FAIR TRADE AND HARMONIZATION
21 (Jagdish Bhagwati & Robert E. Hudec eds., 1996) (discussing non-tariff
barriers).
29. Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral
Negotiations, opened for signature April 15, 1994 in Uruguay Round of Multi-
lateral Trade Negotiations: Legal Instruments Embodying the Results of the
Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations, done at Marrakesh on
April 15, 1994 (1994), 33 I.L.M. 1143 [hereinafter WTO Agreement]. See John
H. Jackson, The Uruguay Round and the Launch of the WTO: Significance &
Challenges, in THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION 5, 8 (Terence P. Stewart ed.,
1996); John H. Jackson, From GATT to the World Trade Organization: Implica-
tions for the World Trading System, in GATT-URUGUAY RouND 29, 30-34
(Thomas Cottier ed., 1995).
30. BERNHARD M. HOEKMAN & MICHEL M. KosTEcKi, THE POLITICAL ECON-
OMY OF THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM, FROM GATT TO WTO 36 (1996); Jos6 M.
Beneyto, The EU and the WTO, 7 EUROPAISCHE ZEITSCHRIFT FOR WIRTSCHAFTS-
RECHT 295, 295 (1996); Jeffrey J. Schott, The Future Role of the WTO, in WORLD
TRADE AFTER THE URUGUAY RouND 105, 105 (Harold Sander & AndrAs Inotai
eds., 1996).
1998]
MIN. J GLoBAL TRADE
on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes
(Dispute Settlement Understanding or DSU).31
The WTO Agreement introduces significant changes to the
rules governing world trade. In addition to introducing new
standards for sectors that previously had not been addressed by
GATT, the WTO Agreement, through the DSU, substantially
changed and elaborated the few existing rules on trade dispute
settlement. 32 The changes made in the DSU reflect the experi-
ence gained in nearly fifty years of solving trade disputes under
the General Agreement and provide the WTO with a procedural
framework to settle disputes between member states.33
B. THE DISPUTE SETTLEMENT PROCEDURE UNDER GATT
AND WTO
GATT provided only a few provisions for solving trade dis-
putes between contracting parties. Lacking definite rules for
both dispute settlement procedure and enforcement of GATT ob-
ligations, GATT's dispute resolution mechanism was considered
to be of a weak legal character. 34
Article XXIII was the centerpiece 35 of the dispute settle-
ment procedure under GATT.36 To successfully invoke the
31. See GATT 1994; Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing
the Settlement of Disputes, April 15, 1994, THE RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY
ROUND OF MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS: THE LEGAL TExTS (1994) [here-
inafter DSU].
32. See GATT 1994, supra note 7; DSU, supra note 31.
33. GATT 1994, appended to the General Agreement in its Annex 1, con-
sists of the provisions in GATT 1947 with subsequent amendments, the provi-
sions of the legal instruments that entered into force under GATT 1947 before
the Agreement entered into force, the decisions by the contracting parties, and
six enumerated understandings which were reached during the Uruguay
Round. See GATT 1994, supra note 7. Thus, the cumulative political and legal
history of the GATT has been incorporated into the WTO. Therefore, and most
importantly, the "authoritative" interpretations and reports by previous dis-
pute-settlement panels under the GATT still influence the WTO.
34. William J. Davey, Dispute Settlement in GATT, 11 FORDHAM INT'L L.J.
51, 67 (1987); Beneyto, supra note 30, at 296; Claudio Cocuzza & Andrea
Forabosco, Are States Relinquishing their Sovereign Rights? The GATT Dispute
Settlement Process in a Globalized Economy, 4 TUL. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 161, 165
(1996). Cf. John H. Jackson, Reflections on International Economic Law, 17 U.
PA. J. INT'L ECON. 17, 21 (1996) ("an impressive new set of dispute settlement
procedures [has been formed]"); Tracy M. Abels, The World Trade Organiza-
tion's First Test: The United States-Japan Auto Dispute, 44 UCLA L. REv. 467,
472 (1996) ("compliance is rigorously surveyed").
35. JACKSON, supra note 14, at 94.
36. Id. at 94; Cocuzza & Forabosco, supra note 34, at 166; Janet McDonald,
Greening the GATT: Harmonizing Free Trade and Environmental Protection in
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mechanism, a contracting party had to claim that benefits accru-
ing to it under GATT had been "nullified or impaired. '37 After
referring the matter to the contracting parties, a panel of ex-
perts was named to examine the dispute.38 If the disputants
found a solution, the panel only reported the agreement and
dropped the case. If the parties failed to reach an agreement,
the panel reported its findings and recommendations to the con-
tracting parties.3 9 If the report was then adopted by a unani-
mous consensus and if the violating party had not implemented
the recommendations or rulings within a certain time limit, the
contracting party bringing the case was authorized to take retal-
iatory measures. 40
With the establishment of the WTO, the dispute settlement
procedure was substantially changed. Probably the most radical
improvement in dispute settlement procedure made by the DSU
was the change from the "positive consensus rule," whereby a
unanimous vote in the GATT Council was needed to adopt a
panel report, to the "negative consensus rule."41 A consensus in
the newly established Dispute Settlement Body is now needed to
reject the adoption of a panel report.42 Additionally, it is now
possible to appeal the decision in a panel report by requesting a
review by the standing appellate body. 43 The DSU furthermore
stipulates that the tribunal must employ customary rules of in-
the New World Order, 23 ENVTL. L. 397, 406 (1993); Nichols, supra note 25, at
392.
37. See General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1947 in Basic Instru-
ments and Selected Documents (B.I.S.D.) (1953) art. XXIII, [hereinafter GATT
19471; JACKSON, supra note 14, at 95.
38. See Understanding Regarding Notification, Consultation, Dispute Set-
tlement and Surveillance, Nov. 28, 1979, GATT B.I.S.D. (26th Supp.) at 212,
§ 10. For a description of the practice at the beginning of GATT's history see
Annex: Agreed Description of the Customary Practice of the GATT in the Field
of Dispute Settlement (Article XXIII:2), GATT B.I.S.D. (26th Supp.) at 217, § 6
(ii) (1979); JACKSON, supra note 14, at 95.
39. Understanding Regarding Notification, Consultation, Dispute Settle-
ment and Surveillance, supra note 38, at 213-14.
40. GATT 1947, supra note 37, art. XXIII:2; Understanding Regarding No-
tification, Consultation, Dispute Settlement and Surveillance, supra note 38, at
214; Ministerial Declaration on Dispute Settlement Procedures, Nov. 29, 1982,
GATT B.I.S.D. (29th Supp.), at 13 (1983).
41. DSU, supra note 31, art. 16(4).
42. Id.
43. DSU, supra note 31, art. 17. The Understanding also introduces inno-
vations such as a definite time-frame for a dispute settlement procedure, the
"right to a panel," a detailed regulation on the implementation of recommenda-
tions and rulings and on compensation for and suspension of obligations. DSU,
supra note 31, arts. 4, 6, 19, 20, 22.
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terpretation of public international law. 44 Future developments
will show whether this framework meets the demands of the
WTO's fast increasing number of disputes.4
5
C. TRADE DISPUTES AND GATT ARTICLE XX
Known as the General Exceptions Clause, Article XX con-
tains provisions that could justify a contracting party's violation
of a GATT obligation. However, an Article XX exception is justi-
fied only if the requirements of Article XX's introductory clause
are met. The pertinent part of Article XX reads:
Subject to the requirement that such measures are not applied in a
manner which would constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable
discrimination between countries where the same conditions prevail,
or a disguised restriction on international trade, nothing in this Agree-
ment shall be construed to prevent the adoption or enforcement by any
contracting party of measures:
(a) necessary to protect public morals .... 46
The text of Article XX is best characterized as broadly and
rather vaguely worded, allowing the possibility that contracting
parties could easily escape their obligations by invoking Article
XX. Even after more than fifty years of GATT practice, there is
no consensus as to the authoritative legal interpretation of some
provisions of Article XX. Article XX section (a) is perhaps the
most prominent example of this lack of consensus. Furthermore,
although nearly every aspect of GATT was reconsidered during
the Uruguay Round negotiation, the interpretation of Article
XX(a) was not elucidated, since the contracting parties chose not
to subject Article XX to significant negotiation at that time. 47
44. DSU, supra note 31, art. 3(2).
45. A periodic examination of an overview of the state-of-play of WTO dis-
putes reveals the rapidity with which the number of disputes before the WTO is
increasing. As of February 1997, 68 consultations had been requested on 45
distinct matters, nine disputes were being examined by panels, two cases were
completed, and 15 were settled or inactive. WTO-Secretariat, Overview of the
State-of-play of WTO Disputes, visited Feb. 20, 1997 <http://www.wto.org/wto/
dispute/bulletin.htm>. A mere eight months later, 104 consultations had been
requested on 72 matters, 14 disputes were being examined by panels, 7 cases
are completed, and 19 are settled or inactive. WTO-Secretariat, Overview of the
State-of-play of WTO Disputes, visited Oct. 29, 1997 <http://www.wto.org/wto/
dispute/bulletin.htm>.
46. GATT 1994, supra note 7, art. XX(a); see also HOEKMAN & KOSTECKI,
supra note 30, at 191; JACKSON, supra note 9, at 744; Piritta Sorsa, GATT and
Environment: Basic Issues and Some Developing Country Concerns, in INTERNA-
TIONAL TRADE AND THE ENVIRONMENT 325, 329 (Patrick Low ed., 1992).
47. Cf THE GATT URUGUAY RouND, A NEGOTIATING HISTORY 1825 (Ter-
ence P. Stewart ed., 1993) (describing the proposals to modify or re-negotiate
[Vol. 7:75
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The lack of an authoritative interpretation of Article XX(a)
is especially troubling because Article XX exceptions are very
frequently invoked in WTO disputes. Typically, when a con-
tracting party brings a case against another contracting party
for allegedly violating GATT obligations, the defendant con-
tracting party will deny that it is violating those obligations.
The defendant will argue, in the alternative, that even if it is
violating GATT obligations, it is justified in doing so under Arti-
cle XX. This explains why any contracting party bringing a case
is well-advised to initially refute any possible invocation of Arti-
cle XX. Unless parties are able to settle their dispute, the panel
dealing with that dispute will have to consider Article XX in its
report. Accordingly, a significant number of cases have ex-
amined the invocation of Article XX.48
aspects of Arts. II, XII, XVII, XVIII, XXIV, XXV, XXVII, and XXXV; and illus-
trating the absence of proposals to modify or re-negotiate Art. XX).
48. Panels have already formulated reports which examine some sections
of Article XX, primarily Article XX sections (b), (d) and (g). See the following
overview [not including Panels' obiter dicta to Article XX]:
1. Appellate Body Report on "United States - Standards for Reformu-
lated and Conventional Gasoline," WT/DS2/9 at 9-29 (May 20, 1996)
[hereinafter Reformulated Gasoline].
2. Panel on "Canada - Administration of the Foreign Investment Re-
view Act," GATT B.I.S.D. (30th Supp.) at 140 (Feb. 7, 1984).
3. Panel on "Canada - Certain Measures Concerning Periodicals,"
WT/DS31/R at 72-4 (Mar. 14, 1997). The issue regarding Article XX(d)
was not raised by the appellants in the following appeal. See Appellate
Body Report on "Canada - Certain Measures Concerning Periodicals,"
WT/DS31/AB/R at 18 (June 30, 1997).
4. Panel on "Canada - Measures Affecting Exports of Unprocessed
Herring and Salmon," GATT B.I.S.D. (35th Supp.) at 98 (Mar. 22,
1988).
5. Panel on "European Economic Community Regulation on Imports
of Parts and Components," GATT B.I.S.D. (37th Supp.) at 132 (May 16,
1990) [hereinafter Imports of Parts and Components].
6. Panel Report on "European Communities - Measures Concerning
Meat and Meat Products (Hormones), Complaint by Canada, Interim
Report at 4.2-4.6 [Article XX(b)] (May 7, 1997). This Interim Report
was adopted on July 1, 1997. Europe's Ban on Beef From U.S. Held
Illegal, N.Y. TIMES, July 2, 1997, at D2; WTO Issues Final Ruling in
U.S. Case Against EU Over Ban on Beef Imports, Int'l Trade Rep.
(BNA) Vol. 14, No. 34 at 1430 (Aug. 20, 1997).
7. Panel on "Japan - Restrictions on Imports of Certain Agricultural
Products," GATT B.I.S.D. (35th Supp.) at 163 (Mar. 22, 1988).
8. Panel on "Thailand - Restrictions on Importation of and Internal
Taxes on Cigarettes," GATT B.I.S.D. (37th Supp.) at 200 (Nov. 7, 1990)
[hereinafter Thai Cigarettes].
9. Panel on "United States - Imports of Certain Automotive Spring
Assemblies," GATT B.I.S.D. (30th Supp.) at 107 (May 26, 1983) [here-
inafter Automotive Spring Assemblies].
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The existence of an Exceptions Clause in the General Agree-
ment is not unusual. Article XX contains provisions that were
customary in commercial agreements preceding the General
Agreement. 49 Similar provisions can be found in recent eco-
nomic treaties, such as Article 12 of the Framework Agreement
on Enhancing ASEAN Economic Cooperation between Brunei-
Darussalam, Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore and
Thailand, 50 Article 36 of the Treaty Establishing the European
Community (EC Treaty)51 and Article XIV of the General Agree-
ment on Trade in Services. 52
10. Panel on "United States - Measures Affecting Alcoholic and Malt
Beverages," GATT B.I.S.D. (39th Supp.) at 206 (June 19, 1983) [herein-
after Alcoholic and Malt Beverages].
11. Panel on "United States - Prohibition of Imports of Tuna and Tuna
Products from Canada," GATT B.I.S.D. (29th Supp.) at 91 (Feb. 22,
1982 [hereinafter Canadian Tuna]).
12. Panel on "United States - Restrictions on Imports of Tuna," GATT
B.I.S.D. (39th Supp.) at 155 (unadopted) (Aug. 16, 1991) [hereinafter
Tuna I].
13. Panel Report on "United States - Restrictions on Imports of Tuna,"
reprinted in 33 I.L.M. 839 (1994), at 890-98 (unadopted) (June 1994)
[hereinafter Tuna II].
14. Panel on "United States - Section 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930,"
GATT B.I.S.D. (36th Supp.) at 345 (Nov. 7, 1989) [hereinafter Section
337].
15. Panel on "United States - Taxes on Automobiles (Luxury Tax; Gas
Guzzler Tax; Corporate Average Fuel Economy (CAFE) Require-
ments), reprinted in 33 I.L.M. 1397 (Oct. 11, 1994).
16. Panel Report on "United States - Standards for Reformulated and
Conventional Gasoline," WT/DS2/R at 6.20-6.41 (appealed) (Jan. 17,
1996).
49. UNITED STATES TARIFF COMMISSION, ANNUAL REPORT 5 (1947); Draft
Report of the Technical Sub-Committee, U.N. Economic and Social Council,
U.N. Doc. E/PC/T/C.II/54 at 32 (Nov. 16, 1946); GATT Secretariat, The Most-
Favoured-Nation Clause in GATT, The Rules and the Exceptions, 4 J. W. TRADE
LAW 791, 797 (1970); WOLFGANG BENEDEK, DIE RECHTSORDNUNG DES GATT AUS
VOLKERRECHTLICHER SICHT 166 (1990).
50. See Article 12 [General Exceptions] of the Framework Agreement on
Enhancing ASEAN Economic Cooperation, 31 I.L.M. 506 (1992).
51. See Article 36 [General Exceptions] of the Treaty establishing the Eu-
ropean Community (EC Treaty), EUROPEAN UNION LAW GUIDE 28 (Philip
Raworth ed., 1996).
52. See General Agreement on Trade in Services, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1B, LEGAL IN-
STRUMENTS-RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND vol. 31; 33 I.L.M. 44 (1994) art.
XIV [hereinafter GATS].
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II. PRELIMINARY QUESTIONS REGARDING THE ROLE
AND INTERPRETATION OF ARTICLE XX IN THE
DISPUTE SETTLEMENT PROCESS
Understanding Article XX requires some preliminary
knowledge of the interpretation of GATT provisions in general
and Article XX in particular. Section A of Part II addresses the
applicable standards of interpretation and establishes the inter-
pretative framework as codified in the Vienna Convention on the
Law of Treaties with regard to the General Agreement. Section
B examines extra-provisional problems of Article XX, which
must be answered before interpreting that provision itself. In
particular, Article XX's structure is discussed in Section B. 1 and
Article XX's pre-provisional requirements are discussed in Sec-
tion B.2. Section B.3 analyzes the necessity of a presumption of
narrowly construing Article XX.
A. MEANS OF INTERPRETATION
The ambiguity associated with interpreting GATT provi-
sions has caused much commentary in the international legal
community. Because many GATT provisions lend themselves to
various interpretations, GATT/WTO panels have sought gui-
dance from the General Agreement's drafting history.53 For ex-
ample, the Panel on "Restrictions on Imports of Tuna" (Tuna I)
examined whether import restrictions the United States im-
posed on tuna products from Mexico could be justified under Ar-
ticle XX(b). 54  Finding that the provision's text did not
unambiguously resolve the issue, the Panel relied immediately
and exclusively on Article XX(b)'s drafting history. Similarly,
the Appellate Body Report on "Standards for Reformulated and
Conventional Gasoline," in determining the object and purpose
of Article XX's introductory clause, considered only its drafting
history.55
The weak character of the GATT dispute settlement system
before January 1, 1995 may explain this reliance on drafting his-
tory.56 Because of the positive consensus rule for the adoption of
panel reports, contracting parties may have relied on drafting
history (especially travaux preparatoires) as a nearly authorita-
53. BENEDEK, supra note 49, at 143.
54. Tuna I, supra note 48, at 155, § 5.22, 5.27.
55. Reformulated Gasoline, supra note 48.
56. Cf JOHN H. JACKSON ET AL., LEGAL PROBLEMS OF INTERNATIONAL Eco-
NOMIC RELATIONS 343 (3d ed. 1995) (attributing GATT dispute settlement
weakness to the positive consensus rule).
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tive and widely accepted interpretative guide. 57 The Uruguay
Round's change to a negative consensus rule could diminish the
future influence of the drafting history in the process of
interpretation.
The preceding discussion raises the question of whether
GATT panels may rely on any rules, besides the general gui-
dance derived from drafting history, in interpreting GATT obli-
gations. The contracting parties did not find it necessary to
codify rules of interpretation in the original GATT. The DSU,
however, now specifies that panels should follow "customary
rules of interpretation of public international law."58 Neverthe-
less, GATT parties still must ascertain which rules of interpre-
tation are part of those customary rules.
Articles 31 through 33 of the Vienna Convention on the Law
of Treaties establish general rules for interpreting international
treaties.59 According to the Convention's principal rule, the
starting point of the interpretation of any treaty is the ordinary
meaning of the treaty's text.60 In addition, the meaning must be
determined by examining the context, object, and purpose of the
treaty.61 Each of these three basic principles must receive equal
consideration. 62 Furthermore, the interpretation itself has to be
carried out in good faith.
Any subsequent practice conducted in furtherance of the
treaty should be considered as part of the context when inter-
preting the treaty.63 A recent Appellate Body Report found that
adopted panel reports alone do not constitute such subsequent
practice, since reports have no precedential weight, only an inter
partes effect.64 The Appellate Body Report did, however, find
that adopted panel reports are part of the "GATT acquis;" 65
thus, the adopted panel reports do carry some precedential
57. BENEDEK, supra note 49, at 143.
58. DSU, supra note 31, art. 3(2).
59. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (May 23, 1969), 1155
U.N.T.S. 331 [hereinafter Vienna Convention].
60. Id. art. 31(1).
61. Id.
62. Official Records, First and Second Sessions, U.N. Conference on the
Law of the Treaties, at 40, U.N. Doc. A/Conf. 39/11/Add.2 (1969) [hereinafter
Official Records].
63. See Vienna Convention, supra note 59, art. 31(3)(b).
64. Appellate Body Report on "Japan - Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages," WT/
DS 8/AB/R, WT/DS 10/ABfR, WT/DS 1l/AB/R, at 13 (Oct. 4, 1996) [hereinafter
Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages].
65. Id. at 14.
[Vol. 7:75
PUBLIC MoRAs IN GATT ARTICLE AWa)
weight in subsequent panel proceedings. 66 This Article does not
intend to further open the Pandora's box regarding the legal ef-
fects of adopted panel reports.67 At any rate, since no adopted
panel report has made any definitive findings regarding the in-
terpretation of Article XX(a), the question may remain open for
the purpose of this piece. 68
According to the Vienna Convention, tools of interpretation
beyond the ordinary meaning of the text and its context, such as
preparatory work,69 are regarded as supplementary so long as
66. JACKSON, RESTRUCTURING, supra note 8, at 67-69; ABRAM CHAYES & AN-
TONIA H. CHAYES, THE NEW SOVEREIGNTY, COMPLIANCE WITH INTERNATIONAL
REGULATORY AGREEMENTS 215 (1995).
67. But see WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding, supra note 8, at 60,
62, 64.
68. One could argue that because it was customary for GATT panels to rely
on drafting history in interpreting GATT provisions, subsequent practice,
within the meaning of the Vienna Convention, is thereby established. Thus,
interpreting a term with the aid of preparatory work would amount to more
than just relying on drafting history; it would rise to the level of an accepted
subsequent practice by the contracting parties in the Convention's hierarchy of
interpretation standards. However, such a notion seems to circumvent this hi-
erarchy because the Convention views drafting history as a mere supplemen-
tary tool of interpretation, despite its frequent use by tribunals. Although
frequent reliance on drafting history may rise to the level of "practice" in GATT
history, the Convention's Articles 31, 32 and 33, along with the context in which
they appear, reveal that such recourse and subsequent practice are fundamen-
tally different. Thus, recourse to drafting history cannot be seen'as subsumed
by the term "subsequent practice in the application of the treaty." Otherwise,
any practice which contradicts and neglects the Convention's hierarchy of inter-
pretation standards could, after being referred to for a sufficient length of time,
upgrade what was considered to be a supplementary device into an essential
tool of interpretation.
A different problem was (obviously unintentionally) raised by the Panel Re-
port on Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products. The Panel unequivo-
cally stated - while citing two past findings of panels - that "according to
established practice, the fundamental rules of treaty interpretation set out in
the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties... form part of these customary
rules of interpretation [in the meaning of Article 3 (2) of the Understanding.]"
Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products, supra note 48 at 5-6. However,
it is doubtful whether two past findings of panels can constitute the "estab-
lished practice" required for the creation of a rule of customary international
law. For a discussion of the creation of a rule of customary international law,
see MALCOLM N. SHAW, INTERNATIONAL LAW 61 (2d ed. 1986); MARK E. VIL-
LIGER, CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW AND TREATIES 3-37 (1985). In addition,
the panel's ambiguous formulation could be read as though the panel implicitly
applied Article 31(3)(b) of the Convention ("subsequent practice") in order to
apply the means of interpretation as set forth in Article 31(1).
69. There is no rule regarding the use of travaux prdparatories in the case
of multilateral treaties which are open to accession by states that did not take
part in the initial negotiations and drafting proceedings. The International
Law Commission stated that those states could request to investigate the
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the meaning of a term according to the rules described above
remains obscure, ambiguous or leads to an absurd or unreasona-
ble result.70 Thus, preparatory work does not constitute an au-
tonomous means of interpretation, but serves only as an aid for
interpretations governed by the general rule described above.7 1
Several objections may be raised concerning the use of the
Convention's rules of interpretation. GATT contracting parties
that are not signatory states to the Vienna Convention could as-
sert that they are not bound by the Convention's rules of inter-
pretation. GATT parties might also argue that because the
Convention came into force in 198072 and has no retroactive op-
eration,73 at least the GATT 1947 provisions are not subject to
the Convention's rules. However, the Convention clearly gov-
erns the interpretation of GATT 1994, as GATT 1994 took effect
almost fifteen years after the Convention. Because the Conven-
tion also governs treaties constituting international organiza-
tions and those adopted within an international organization, 74
the WTO Agreement and its Annexes must be interpreted ac-
cording to the rules stated above.
It has been suggested that the Convention's means of inter-
pretation have attained the status of customary international
law75 through a long-standing practice by states and a corre-
sponding opiniojuris.76 Although there is no doubt that certain
provisions of the Convention merely embody customary rules of
international law,7 7 there is less certainty about whether the
travaux priparatoires before acceding and therefore no special rule was needed.
See Official Records, supra note 62, at 43.
70. See Vienna Convention, supra note 59, art. 32(1) (stating the general
rules for interpreting international treaties).
71. Official Records, supra note 62, at 43; IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF
PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAw 630 (4th ed. 1990); IAN SINCLAIR, THE VIENNA CON-
VENTION ON THE LAW OF TREATIES 72 (1973).
72. SHAw, supra note 68, at 459.
73. Vienna Convention, supra note 59, art. 4.
74. See Vienna Convention, supra note 59, art. 5.
75. Reformulated Gasoline, supra note 48 at 23; Taxes on Alcoholic Bever-
ages, supra note 64 at sec. D; Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products,
supra note 48, at 5. See also BENEDEK, supra note 49, at 143; PAR HALLSTROM,
THE GATT PANELS AND THE FORMATION OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAw 170
(1994); JACKSON, supra note 14, at 88; Lei Wang, Some Observations on the Dis-
pute Settlement System in the World Trade Organization, 29 J. OF WORLD
TRADE 173, 177 (1995).
76. Cf SHAw, supra note 68, at 61 (discussing the creation of a rule of inter-
national customary law); VILLIGER, supra note 68, at 3-37.
77. See, e.g., Fisheries Jurisdiction (U.K. v. Ice.), Jurisdiction of the Court,
1973 I.C.J. Reports 3, 18 (explaining how Article 62 embodies the international
law principle of termination of a treaty by reason of change of circumstances).
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rules of interpretation in the Convention reflect rules of custom-
ary international law. Considering the different practices that
states used to interpret treaties before the Convention was
drawn,78 one could argue that there has been neither a consis-
tent nor a long enough practice, necessary for the development
of a customary rule. However, even if this argument was per-
suasive, the Convention's rules would nonetheless be applicable
to GATT 1994.
Finally, one could argue that the Vienna Convention simply
comprises aspects of all doctrines of treaty interpretation which
existed in international law before the Convention was drawn.7 9
This is strong evidence that these various rules as codified in the
Convention really reflect customary international law. There-
fore, the Vienna Convention's rules of interpretation should be
utilized in interpreting the provisions of the General Agreement.
B. INTERPRETATION OF GATT ARTICLE XX
Article XX (the Exceptions Clause) exemplifies how GATT
provisions may be plagued by ambiguity and lack of current in-
terpretative guidance. Because of the lack of interpretative gui-
dance, the invocation of the Exceptions Clause by a contracting
party requires a panel to carry out adjudicatory functions that
closely resemble statutory interpretation in domestic courts.
Sections 1 and 2 discuss how the structure of Article XX pro-
vides panels with a particular order and form for examining pre-
provisional requirements of legal norms on which they may base
their rulings. Section 3 illuminates how elusive interpretative
rules that past panels employed could lead to an interpretation
beyond and almost contrary to the relevant legal norm in a
dispute.
1. Structure of GATT Article XX
Article XX is divided into a general introductory clause (Pre-
amble) and subsequent provisions that constitute the circum-
stances under which exceptions to GATT obligations are
justified.80 The language used in Article XX's Preamble clearly
states that the Preamble applies as a general rule to all subse-
quent categories of Article XX. The specific action taken by a
contracting party must fall under one of the ten enumerated
paragraphs, denoted (a) to (j), to be justified. Thus, an indivi-
78. See Official Records, supra note 62, at 38.
79. SHAw, supra note 68, at 480.
80. See supra note 7.
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dual contracting party which seeks to justify a measure under
Article XX must take an action which both falls within
paragraphs (a) - (j) and meets the Preamble's standards.
The language of Article XX's Preamble establishes a se-
quential order which should be followed when applying Article
XX to a particular dispute. The Preamble begins by referring to
"such measures," which become permissible under the excep-
tions in paragraphs (a) - (j), before stipulating the specific stan-
dards that "such measures" must further meet to be acceptable
under GATT. Thus, Article XX's structure creates a two-part
test: first, an action taken by a contracting party must be char-
acterized as a measure under one of the paragraphs (a) - (j); sec-
ond, those measures are subject to the additional requirements
of the Preamble itself.
Some panel reports have ignored this sequential order when
addressing Article XX. For instance, the Panels on both "United
States - Prohibition of Imports of Tuna and Tuna Products from
Canada"81 and "United States - Imports of Certain Automotive
Spring Assemblies" 8 2 first examined whether the measures
taken by the United States met the Preamble's requirements
before examining whether those measures could actually be re-
garded as a measure justifiable within any of the meanings of
paragraphs (a) through (j).
Applying Article XX in its reverse order would not have led
to different results in those cases. However, this observation
nevertheless reveals that the Panels simply ignored the logical
order which Article XX's language requires. Recent Panels have
adhered to the sequential order which Article XX's structure
suggests by first examining the measure within the scope of Ar-
ticle XX's relevant paragraph, and then focusing, if necessary,
on the requirements the Preamble itself imposes.8 3
2. GATT - Violation As a Requirement
Article XX's Preamble explicitly states that "nothing in this
Agreement shall be construed to prevent the adoption or en-
forcement by any contracting party of measures" justified under
Article XX's general exceptions.8 4 Article XX thus allows a con-
81. Canadian Tuna, supra note 48, § 4.8, at 91.
82. Automotive Spring Assemblies, supra note 48, § 54-68.
83. Section 337, supra note 48, § 5.22-5.26; Imports of Parts and Compo-
nents, supra note 48, § 5.12-5.18; Thai Cigarettes, supra note 48, § 72-81; Alco-
holic and Malt Beverages, supra note 48, § 5.40-5.69; Reformulated Gasoline,
supra note 48, 13.
84. GATT, supra note 7, art. XX.
[Vol. 7:75
PUBLIC MORALS IN GAIYT ARTICLE XA(a)
tracting party to deviate from any contractual obligations in the
Agreement.88 Consequently, Article XX would not be invoked
unless a direct violation of a GATT obligation has occurred. A
contracting party's violation, for example, may consist of an im-
port ban imposed on foreign goods or of an export restriction on
domestic goods.86 Additionally, a contracting party will not look
to Article XX if its action is justified by the same provision that
it has violated. For instance, a quantitative restriction tempo-
rarily applied by a contracting party to prevent critical
shortages of foodstuffs would violate GATT Article XI:1, but
could be justified under Article XI:2(a).8 7 As a result, because
the contracting party justified its violation under Article XI:2(a),
it would not need to invoke Article XX.
Article XX allows GATT parties to act contrary to their obli-
gations as long as such action meets the requirements of Article
XX. However, Article XX does not permit a GATT party to
maintain an action which was justified at the outset, but which,
due to a change in circumstances, no longer meets the require-
ments of Article XX. Thus, since Article XX does not include any
time limits, its requirements have to be met throughout the
whole period in which both the action in violation of GATT obli-
gations is in effect and its justification is being sought under Ar-
ticle XX.88
85. Reformulated Gasoline, supra note 48, at 24; Measures Concerning
Meat and Meat Products, supra note 48, at 9.
86. Cf. the wording of Article XX(c) ("... relating to the importation of gold
or silver") and Article XX(f) ("... imposed for the protection of national
treasures of artistic, historic or archaeological value"). Article XX(a), however,
most likely only applies to import restrictions imposed on foreign goods, be-
cause the factual scenario that an exporting country will prevent the export of
domestic goods which could violate another importing countries' public morals
seems to be very remote from current international trade realities. For an ex-
amination of the possible "extra-territorial" ramifications in this context, supra
note 7, see infra Part III.E.4.
87. GATT 1994, supra note 7, arts. XI:I and XI:2. If the requirements of
Article XI:2(a) are met, the quantitative restrictions are justified and do not
violate GATT Article XI:1.
88. Interesting procedural questions arise for parties considering invoking
and defending an Article XX argument. Arguably, a justified action under Arti-
cle XX may subsequently turn into an unjustifiable measure and vice versa. In
the former case there is no procedural problem; however, the party requesting a
panel would be well-advised to underscore the circumstances which allegedly
changed the once-justified measure into an unjustifiable one. In the case of a
formerly unjustifiable measure becoming a justified measure, the solution is not
that obvious. Because the goal of the dispute settlement procedure is to acheive
full compliance with GATT obligations after a report has been adopted, the
question arises whether a contracting party can request a panel if the other
contracting party now indisputably complies with its GATT obligations even
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3. Presumption of narrow construction?
Some recent panel reports stated that Article XX exceptions
must be construed narrowly,8 9 whereas other panel reports sim-
ply failed to mention this presumption of narrow construction. 9 0
Many legal scholars agree that because it is an exception to
GATT's general rules, Article XX should be interpreted
restrictively.9 1
Neither the wording of Article XX nor the Vienna Conven-
tion on the Law of Treaties includes a rule suggesting that ex-
ceptions should be narrowly construed. Thus, the question
arises whether the presumption of narrow construction is truly
appropriate when interpreting Article XX. Although the panel
reports stated that it was, the rule was not applied in a manner
which amounted to any legal consequence. Rather, the panels
seemed to mention its existence merely as an introductory con-
sideration of and general reflection on Article XX.9 2
though it did not in the past. An argument against this "ex-post investigation"
is that the establishment of a panel would be moot.
On the other hand, such "ex-post investigation" and a formal declaration of
past illegal practices of a contracting party could play a role in domestic polit-
ical discussions as well as in international affairs. This question has not been
addressed yet and its answer could reveal a lack of available legal remedies
within the dispute settlement process; consequently, procedural law, rather
than substantive law, begins to govern the problem.
89. Alcoholic and Malt Beverages, supra note 48, § 5.41; Tuna I, supra note
48, § 5.22.
There is a presumption of narrow construction as a general principle of
interpreting GATT exceptions which allow an abrogation of GATT obligations,
see Panel on "United States - Countervailing Duties on Fresh, Chilled and Fro-
zen Pork from Canada", July 11, 1991, GATT B.I.S.D. (38'" Supp.) § 4.4; Panel
on "Canada - Import Restrictions on Ice Cream and Yoghurt", Dec. 5, 1989,
GATT B.I.S.D. (36 th Supp.), § 59; Alcoholic and Malt Beverages, supra note 48,
§ 5.41.
90. Automotive Spring Assemblies, supra note 48, § 50; Panel on "Canada -
Administration of the Foreign Investment Review Act," Feb. 7, 1984, GATT
B.I.S.D. (30th Supp.), § 5.20 [hereinafter Foreign Investment Review Act];
Panel on "Canada - Measures Affecting Exports of Unprocessed Herring and
Salmon," Mar. 22, 1988, GATT B.I.S.D. (35th Supp.), § 4.4 [hereinafter Un-
processed Herring and Salmon]; Imports of Parts and Components, supra note
48, § 5.12.
91. BENEDEK, supra note 49, at 163; EDMOND McGovEm., INT'L TRADE REG-
ULATION, § 13.112 (1995); Christopher A. Cherry, Environmental Regulation
within the GATT Regime: A New Definition of Product, 40 UCLA L. REV. 1061,
1083 (1993); Jan Kiabbers, Jurisprudence in International Trade Law, Article
XX of GATT, 26 J. WORLD TRADE 63, 70, 88 (1992).
92. See Unprocessed Herring and Salmon, supra note 90, § 4.4; Automotive
Spring Assemblies, supra note 48, § 50; Foreign Investment Review Act, supra
note 90, § 5.20; Imports of Parts and Components, supra note 48, § 5.12.
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Both common and civil law systems contain the rule that
exceptions are to be narrowly construed.93 While appearing to
both limit and clarify the scope of a law's application, the rule of
strict construction is flexible enough to achieve either a narrow
or broad interpretation of the Exceptions Clause, depending on
the factual situation and the application of the rule.9 4 An adju-
dicator may choose to narrowly interpret an exception by exclud-
ing factual situations typically covered by the exception
language or which were intended to be covered by that excep-
tion. Conversely, an adjudicator may opt to broadly interpret an
exception by including factual situations which typically fall
outside either the purview of the exception language or its in-
tent. However, the outcome is always dependent upon the man-
ner in which the rule of narrow construction is applied in the
individual case and thus is ultimately dependent on the will of
the adjudicator.
Some scholars have astutely questioned the general applica-
bility of the rule of strict construction, especially its potential
impact on the Exceptions Clause. Some commentators have ar-
gued that this rule should be abandoned because of its ambigu-
ous scope and problematic definition, and have instead
suggested an Exceptions Clause should be interpreted according
to the general criteria of construction of international treaties. 95
Most importantly, some adjudicators may use the rule of strict
construction to dispose of the issue of interpretation prema-
turely, instead of using it as a guide to interpretation,96 which
would defeat the purpose of the interpretation.
In the context of Article XX, the presumption of narrow con-
struction has dubious practical value because the factual situa-
tion will always control the result. If a factual situation does not
fall within a certain Article XX paragraph, those grounds for an
exception cannot support an outcome based on the rule of strict
construction alone. On the other hand, if a set of particular facts
falls directly within the scope of a paragraph, those grounds for
exception can support an outcome without recourse to any rules
93. A.H. Phillips Inc. v. Walling, 324 U.S. 490, 493 (1944); KARL LARENZ,
METHODENLEHRE DER RECHTSWISSENSCHAFT 337 (5th ed. 1983); FRIEDRICH
MULLER, JURISTISCHE METHODIK 211 (3d ed. 1989); Sutherland Stat. Const.
§ 47.11 (4th ed. 1992).
94. A.H. Phillips Inc. v. Walling, supra note 93; LARENZ, supra note 93, at
340.
95. Sutherland Stat. Const., supra note 93, § 47.11. Cf MULLER, supra note
93, at 212.
96. BROWNLIE, supra note 71, at 626.
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of interpretation. Thus, the presumption of narrow construction
appears rather unnecessary and almost superfluous, and could
arguably lead to further misconstructions of Article XX.
Some commentators suggest that three additional require-
ments must be met before the presumption of narrow construc-
tion may be used to interpret Article XX. 97 First, the measure
must be intended to achieve the objective mentioned in the ex-
ception; second, a party may not use a measure which deviates
from GATT rules more than needed to achieve the measure's ob-
jective; third, the measure must be a proportional response to
the circumstances that gave rise to the measure.98 It seems
questionable whether these additional requirements could actu-
ally be deduced from a rule of interpretation without examining
the actual language of the Article XX paragraph. In other
words, this assumption perfectly exemplifies how a rule of inter-
pretation could begin a life of its own if it were not linked to and
limited by the actual language of Article XX. Thus, it is desira-
ble to abandon the presumption of narrow construction in inter-
preting Article XX.
III. INTERPRETATION OF "PUBLIC MORALS"
Article XX(a) allows GATT parties to impose measures con-
trary to their obligations as long as such measures are necessary
to protect public morals. Unlike other sections of Article XX,
neither section (a) nor its construction have ever been examined
by a GATT panel. Thus, very little information is available to
help interpret the phrase "necessary to protect public morals."99
This absence of interpretation of section (a) is reflected by a lack
of legal scholarship dealing with Article XX as a whole. 100
97. McGoVERN, supra note 91, § 13.112. It is not implausible to infer these
additional requirements from the language of Article XX itself, since the exact
meaning of the "necessary" or "relating to-" requirement is still unclear.
See also Klabbers, supra note 91, at 89 (trying to deduce the allocation of
burdens of proof with respect to Article XX from the presumption of narrow
construction).
98. See McGOVERN, supra note 91, § 13.112.
99. Past panel reports mainly examined Article XX(b), (d) and (g). See
supra note 48. This explains why the Analytical Index to GATT Law and Prac-
tice does not provide any annotations to Article XX(a). See GATT, ANALYTICAL
INDEX: GUIDE TO GATT LAw AND PRACTICE 565 (6th ed. 1995).
100. See KENNETH W. DAM, THE GATT, LAW AND INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC
ORGANIZATION 193 (1970); McGovERN, supra note 91, § 13.12; HOEKMANN &
KOSTECKI, supra note 30, at 190; JACKSON, supra note 9, at 741, 743; ERNST-
ULRICH PETERSMANN, INTERNATIONAL AND EUROPEAN TRADE AND ENVIRONMEN-
TAL LAW AFTER THE URUGUAY ROUND 51 (1995) [hereinafter INT'L AND EURo-
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Part III aims to develop a general interpretation of Article
XX(a) by applying the rules of interpretation found in the Vi-
enna Convention of the Law of Treaties. The analysis focuses on
the applicability of Article XX(a) to import restrictions imposed
on the production method rather than on the product. Two re-
cent developments with potentially major impact on interna-
tional trade will illustrate this problem. First, a recent
European Community regulation on pelts and fur highlights the
conundrum between process and product and thus warrants in-
vestigation by a WTO panel. Second, the expansive interpreta-
tion of Article XX(a) could remedy the lack of a "social clause" in
the General Agreement.
The issue of whether GATT provisions are applicable to
measures which regulate the method of production of an item,
rather than the product itself,101 was examined in "United
States - Restrictions on Imports of Tuna."10 2 The United States
imposed import restrictions on products made from tuna caught
with harvesting methods that caused the incidental killing or
serious injury of dolphin. 10 3 Otherwise indistinguishable im-
ported tuna products caught in an "dolphin-safe" manner were
not subject to import restrictions. 04 If these process restrictions
violated GATT obligations, 0 5 then the question of justification
under Article XX arose. In the Tuna-Dolphin dispute, the Panel
examined Article XX(b) and (g); Article XX(a) was not invoked in
the dispute.
PEAN TRADE]; RIcHARD SENTI, GATT SYSTEM DER WELTHANDELSORDNUNG 275
(1986); Klabbers, supra note 91, at 63.
101. See Steve Charnovitz, Green Roots, Bad Pruning: GATT Rules and
their Application to Environmental Trade Measures, 7 TuL. ENVTL. L.J. 299,
323 (1994); William J. Snape & Naomi B. Lefkovitz, Searching for GAT's Envi-
ronmental Miranda: Are "Process Standards" Getting "Due Process?", 27 COR-
NELL INT'L L.J. 777, 796-99 (1994); Alan Isaac Zreczny, The Process/Product
Distinction and the Tuna /Dolphin Controversy: Greening the GATT Through
International Agreement, 1 BUFF. J. INT'L L. 79, 115 (1994).
102. Tuna I, supra note 48, at 155; Tuna II, supra note 48, at 839.
103. Tuna I, supra note 48, § 5.2.
104. Tuna I, supra note 48, § 2.7 ("On August 28, 1990, the U.S. government
imposed an embargo.., on imports of commercial yellowfin tuna... caught by
purse-seine nets ... ).
105. See JACKSON et al., supra note 56, at 585; Steve Charnovitz, Exploring
the Environmental Exceptions in GATT Article XX, 25 J. OF WORLD TRADE 37,
53 (1991); Cherry, supra note 91, at 1067; John H. Jackson, World Trade Rules
and Environmental Policies: Congruence or Conflict?, 49 WASH. & LEE L. REV.
1227, 1242 (1992).
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A. THE EEC REGULATION ON PELTS AND FUR
For many years, there has been a broad discussion about
"animal welfare" and "animal rights" in the European Commu-
nity.10 6 Various regulatory measures have been implemented to
improve conditions of animals used in the production of certain
products, such as cosmetics, meat, or fur. Examples of these
regulatory efforts include a EU directive which orders member
states to end the sale of all cosmetics tested on animals by June
30, 2000,107 and a proposed directive modifying the standards
for trucks used by the meat industry to transport animals. 0 8
The latest effort to improve "animal welfare" in the Euro-
pean Community is the proposed ban on imports of fur from ani-
mals caught by leg-hold traps. 10 9 The debate over leg-hold traps
is dominated by discussion of the inhumane and cruel character
of this trapping method. The trap consists of spring-powered
steel jaws designed to capture an animal by the limb with tre-
mendous force. 10 The traps usually break the animals' legs but
106. See, e.g., Man's Mirror (Animal Rights), THE ECONOMIST, Nov. 16, 1991,
at 21; Barry James, Pro-Animal Campaign Sets Sights on France and Its Foie
Gras Trade, INT'L HERALD-TRIBUNE, Dec. 8, 1993, at 6; The Morality of Animal
Rights, FIN. TIMES, Jan. 30, 1995, at 17.
107. Commission Directive 97/18/EC Postponing the Date After Which
Animal Tests Are Prohibited for Ingredients or Combinations of Ingredients of
Cosmetic Products (17. April 1997), art. 1, 1997 O.J. (L 114), 43. See generally
Council Directive 76/768/EEC on the Approximation of the Laws of the Member
States Relating to Cosmetics Products (27. July 1976), art. 4 section 1 lit. i,
1976 O.J. (L 262), 169.
108. Proposal for a European Parliament and Council Directive relating to
motor vehicles and their trailers transporting certain animals and amending
Directive 70/156/EEC in respect of the type-approval of motor vehicles and their
trailers, 1997 O.J. (C290) 1.
Japan and the United States may bring a claim in the WTO against a blan-
ket import ban on cosmetics and other goods tested on or produced from ani-
mals which are not transported according to certain standards. This claim
would raise issues similar to those raised in the Tuna-Dolphin dispute, includ-
ing measures imposed on behalf of production methods, the possible "extra-ter-
ritorial" effect of domestic environmental provisions, and others.
109. MEP Bloch von Blottnitz in EUR. PARL. (4-472) 1 (Dec. 1, 1995).
110. See Council Regulation 3254/91 on Prohibiting the Use of Leg Hold
Traps in the Community and the Introduction Into the Community of Pelts and
Manufactured Goods of Certain Wild Animal Species Originating in Countries
Which Catch Them by Means of Leg Hold Traps or Trapping Methods Which Do
Not Meet International Humane Trapping Standards, art. 1, 1991 O.J. (L 308)
1 [hereinafter Council Regulation (EEC) No. 3254/91]; Daniel P. Blank, Target-
Based Environmental Trade Measures: A Proposal For the New WTO Commit-
tee on Trade and Environment, 15 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 61, 120 (1996); see also
EUR. PARL. (4-472) 10-16 (Dec. 13, 1995).
[Vol. 7:75
PuBLIc MoRALs iv GA7T ARTcLE XY(a)
do not kill them.111 The trapped animal remains alive for a
lengthy period of time and sometimes even chews off its own
limb in a desperate effort to escape. 112 Aquatic animals caught
underwater usually drown because they cannot reach the sur-
face to breathe. 13
In 1988, the European Union took the first legal action
against leg-hold traps by adopting a resolution relating to label-
ing requirements for such fur. 1 4 In 1991, the Council of the Eu-
ropean Community enacted a regulation prohibiting the use of
leg-hold traps in all countries of the European Community effec-
tive January 1, 1995.115 In addition, imports of fur from thir-
teen different species commonly caught by leg-hold traps were
banned, except when in the country of origin the use of leg-hold
traps is prohibited or trapping methods meet internationally
agreed humane trapping standards.' 16
Because the European Community hoped to enter into an
agreement with the United States, Canada and Russia on this
matter, the implementation of the import ban was repeatedly
postponed. The European Community's agreement to delay the
implementation of the ban was based on a clause in the regula-
tion which allowed suspension until December 31, 1995 if "suffi-
cient progress is being made in developing humane methods of
trapping" by the fur exporting countries. 1 7 The suspension was
further prolonged until December 31, 1996 to avoid jeopardizing
the achievements gained by both the International Organization
for Standardization 118 and a working group on the development
111. Peter V. Michaud, Caught in a Trap: The European Union Leghold
Trap Debate, 6 MiNN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 355, 358 (1997); Paul Brown, EU Move
to Lift Fur Ban Challenged, THE GUARDIAN, Dec. 24, 1996, at 5.
112. Patricia Doyle, The European Community and Wildlife Supervision:
The Sovereign Right to Protect National Resources, 9 N.Y. INT'L L. REV. 49, 63
(1996).
113. Brown, supra note 111.
114. Doyle, supra note 112, at 63.
115. See Council Regulation (EEC) No. 3254/91, art. 2, supra note 110.
116. See id. at art. 3(1).
117. See id. at art. 3(2); Commission Regulation 1771/94 of July 19 1994 on
Laying Down Provisions on the Introduction Into the Community of Pelts and
Manufactured Goods of Certain Wild Animal Species, 1994 O.J. (L 184) 3 [here-
inafter Commission Regulation (EEC) No. 1771/94].
118. Since 1987, the International Organization for Standardization (ISO)
has tried to develop international humane standards for the trapping of mam-
mals. Recently, one technical committee, "TC 191 Animal (mammal) traps,"
consisting of 15 participating and eight observing countries, was established.
International Standards Organization, TC 191 Animal (mammal) traps (visited
Dec. 12, 1997) <http://www.iso.ch/meme/TC191.html>. This technical commit-
tee works on the standardization of terminology, classification, characteristics
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of international humane trapping standards, consisting of Can-
ada, the United States, Russia and the Community. 119 An infor-
mal decision by the Council of the European Community in
December 1996 again postponed the import ban.120 Although no
definite decision was made, there was an apparent understand-
ing that the ban would come into effect no later than March 31,
1997.121 Finally, after five months of negotiation, the Commu-
nity, Canada and Russia reached a compromise on trapping
standards.122
In July 1997, the European Union's Foreign Affairs Coun-
cil1 23 finally approved this compromise, which was highly con-
troversial in the European Union. 124 The objective of the
"International Agreement on Humane Trapping Standards" is
and test methods for effective mammal traps and their use. Id. In the process
of the development of an international standard, the committee finalized its
work in a draft International Standard (ISO/DIS 10990-4 Animal (mammal)
traps) which was circulated to all ISO members' bodies for voting and comment
within a specific time period.
119. Commission Proposal for a Council Regulation Amending Council Reg-
ulation 3254/91 EEC Prohibiting the Use of Leg Hold Traps in the Community
and the Introduction Into the Community of Pelts and Manufactured Goods of
Certain Wild Animal Species Originating in Countries Which Catch Them By
Means of Leg Hold Traps or Trapping Methods Which Do Not Meet Interna-
tional Humane Trapping Standards, COM (95) 737 final [hereinafter Commis-
sion Proposal for a Council Regulation Amending Council Regulation No. 3254/
91].
120. EU Insists on End to Steel Traps - Import Ban Due End March,
DEUTSCHE PRESSE AGENTUR, Dec. 9, 1996, available in LEXIS, INTRAD File;
EU May Ban Fur Imports in Dispute Over Leg Hold Traps, 13 INT'L TRADE REP.
(BNA) 1916 (Dec. 11, 1996). The decision was clouded by a serious dispute over
the competence of the Commission to delay the ban without being affirmed by
the Parliament or the Council, in which the Parliament even considered the
initiation of a procedure in the ECJ under Article 175 EC (failure to act by an
institution). See MEP Pimenta in EuR. PARL. (4-472) 12 (Dec. 13, 1995). See
also Animal Welfare: Euro-MPS Corner Commission on Leg-Hold Traps, EuR.
REP., April 27, 1996; EUICanada! US/Russia: Netherlands holds out alone on
leg-hold traps, EuR. ENV'T, Jan. 23, 1996; both available in WESTLAW,
ALLNEWS File.
121. There is no apparent legal basis for this date, as the definite date on
which the ban was to take effect is Dec. 31, 1995. Art. 3(1), Council Regulation
(EEC) No. 3254/91, supra note 110.
122. Fur Ban Threat Looms as EUApproves Standard Banning Animal Leg-
Hold Traps, Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) Vol. 14, No. 30 at 1265 (hereinafter Fur Ban
Threat Looms). See also Defend Our Trappers, TORONTO STAR, Dec. 30, 1996;
Ric Dolphin, Metis President Hopeful on Fur Agreement, EDMONTON J., Dec. 26,
1996; Europe Rejects Fur Boycott But Formal Vote Still Needed, EDMONTON J.,
Jan. 15, 1997; European Union Rejects Fur Ban, EDMONTON J., Dec. 19, 1996.
123. Fur Ban Threat Looms, supra note 122; at 1265.
124. Leghold Traps Deal Approved, FIN TIMES, July 24, 1997.
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to "... establish standards on humane trapping methods. 1 25 It
applies to "trapping methods and the certification of traps for
the trapping of wild terrestrial or semi-aquatic mammals for
wildlife management including pest control; obtaining fur, skin
or meat; and the capture of mammals for conservation.' 26 The
Agreement additionally requires its parties to prohibit traps
which do not meet the standards for restraining or killing trap-
ping methods as set forth in Part 1 of the Agreement's Annex
1.127 Competent authorities from the parties to the Agreement
must certify the trapping methods' compliance with the codified
standards within three to five years after the Agreement be-
comes effective for restraining trapping methods, and within five
years after the Agreement becomes effective for killing trapping
methods. 128 According to Article 7 of the Agreement, the compe-
tent authorities then prohibit those trapping methods which do
not meet the certification requirements after an additional three
years.129
Canada declared that restraining trapping methods for a
number of species will be prohibited as soon as the Agreement
becomes effective. 130 For a number of other species, the meth-
ods will be prohibited within approximately three years. 131 The
Russian Federation declared that it would prohibit leg-hold
traps beginning January 1, 2000, provided it received sufficient
financial compensation for finding and applying alternative
trapping methods. 132 If sufficient financial aid is not received, it
would prohibit all leg-hold traps within four years after the
Agreement becomes effective. 133 At first, the United States did
125. Proposal for a Council Decision Concerning the Signing and Conclusion
of an International Agreement Between the European Community, Canada and
the Russian Federation on Humane Trapping Standards, art. 2, 1997 O.J.
(C 95), 46 and Amended proposal for a Council Decision concerning the signing
and conclusion of an Agreement on international humane trapping standards
between the European Community, Canada and the Russian Federation, art. 2,
1997 O.J. (C 207), 14, 16 [hereinafter Amended Proposal for an International
Agreement].
126. Amended Proposal for an International Agreement, art. 3, supra note
125.
127. Id. at art. 7 (3).
128. See the schedule in Amended Proposal for an International Agreement,
Annex 1, Part 2, No. 4.2.1, supra note 125.
129. Id. at Annex 1, Part 2, No. 4.2.2.
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not join the compromise.134 Instead, the United States
threatened to request a WTO panel on this issue. 135 After long
negotiations the United States and the EC reached a compro-
mise in which the United States will prohibit the use of leg-hold
traps within a period of 6 years. 136
According to the original regulation, the main reason for im-
posing import restrictions on fur and pelt products manufac-
tured from fur of animals caught with leg-hold traps is the
production method's inability to meet humane trapping stan-
dards. 137 If this regulation were considered under Article XX(b),
it might face a question similar to the one raised in the Tuna-
Dolphin dispute - whether Article XX(b) can justify import re-
strictions based on process rather than product.
To fall within the scope of Article XX(b), the restrictions
must have been imposed to protect animal life or health. The
restrictions are supposed to ban all imports of furs and pelts
that were obtained by a cruel and inhumane trapping method.
However, the fur or pelt-products inherently require the death
of the animal. Thus, the restrictions on cruel and inhumane
trapping standards deal more with the method of killing than
with the protection of animal life or health. Therefore, the regu-
lation does not prima facie fall within the scope of Article
134. See Neil Buckley, Leghold Traps Deal Approved, FIN. TIMES, July 24,
1997, at 5. Because several U.S. states have passed their own laws relating to
leghold traps, federalism restricts the U.S. government from passing nation-
wide restrictions. See, e.g., Gary Gerhardt, Coyote Problem Raises Its Head
Again, Metro-area Incidents Renew Debate About Using Leg-Hold Traps, ROCKY
MOUNTAIN NEWS (Denver), July 13, 1997, at 39A.
135. Leyla Boulton & Caroline Southey, London Urges Hard Line by EU on
Leg-hold Traps, FIN. TIMES, Dec. 23, 1996, at 2; Brown, supra note 111; EU
Insists on End to Steel Traps - Import Ban Due End March, supra note 120;
Caroline Southey & Nancy Dunne, Fur Flies in Trapping Row, FIN. TIMES, Dec.
9, 1996, at 6.
136. Der Kompromiss iiber die Fangeisen ist mit Mehrheit angenommen
worden und die Amerikanischen Pelze konnen in die EU eingefiirt werden,
Agence Europe No. 7111, Dec. 1, 1997. See also EU/USA: Moglicherweise
Kompromiss in der Frage der Fangeisen und des Einfuhrverbotes fir Felle,
Agence Europe No. 7110, Nov. 29, 1997; Neil Buckley, EU Relents over US Fur
Ban, FIN. TIMES, Dec. 2, 1997, at 7.
137. Council Regulation (EEC) 3254/91, Preamble, supra note 110, sec. 8;
Commission Regulation (EEC) 1771/94, supra note 117, Preamble, sec. 3 & 4;
Commission Proposal for a Council Regulation Amending Council Regulation
3254/91, supra note 119, Sec. 2 of the Explanatory Memorandum of the Propo-
sal. Similar reasoning may be found in Australia's third-party submission in
Tuna I - it argued that Art. XX(a) could justify measures regarding inhumane
treatment of animals. See Tuna I, supra note 48, at § 4.4.
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XX(b). 138 Likewise, an argument premised on Article XX(g)
would fail, because even if animals could be seen as exhaustible
natural resources within the meaning of this exception, the re-
strictions do not deal with the conservation of animals.139 It re-
mains unclear whether Article XX(a) could be used to justify
measures taken to restrict imports of products based on their
cruel and inhumane production method, which result from the
"immoral" nature of the trapping method. 4 0
B. INCLUSION OF A "SOCIAL CLAUSE"
Concerns similar to those raised in the leg-hold trap scena-
rio are found in an examination of the social conditions of the
production process of a good. The inclusion of a "social clause" in
international trade has recently received strong support.1 4 1 Ex-
amples of such social clauses can be found in the Protocol on
Social Policy in the Maastricht Treaty 4 2 and in the agreement
on labor cooperation appended to NAFTA.143 At the WTO min-
138. See also Blank, supra note 110, at 120; Michaud, supra note 111, at
373. Article XX(b) could theoretically apply only if "non-target species," such as
endangered species or even playing children, became victims of the leg-hold
traps. Because the European Community does not use this or any similar rea-
soning to justify its regulation, the regulation is obviously not aimed at the pro-
tection of "human, animal ... life or health."
139. GATT art. XX(g).
140. Cf. Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, Trade and Environmental Protection:
The Practice of GATT and the European Community Compared in TRADE & THE
ENVIRONMENT: THE SEARCH FOR BALANCE 147, 162 (James Cameron et al. eds.,
1994).
141. Harald Grossmann & Georg Koopmann, Social Standards in Interna-
tional Trade, A New Protectionist Wave?, in WORLD TRADE AFTER THE URUGUAY
ROUND 115 (Harald Sander & Andrds Inotai eds., 1996); Virginia A. Leary,
Workers' Rights and International Trade: The Social Clause (GATT, ILO,
NAFTA, US Laws), in FAIR TRADE AND HARMONIZATION, VOL. 2 LEGAL ANALY-
sis, at 172 (Jagdish Bhagwati & Robert E. Hudec eds., 1996); Patricia Sterling,
The Use of Trade Sanctions as an Enforcement Mechanism for Basic Human
Rights: A Proposal for Addition to the World Trade Organization, 11 AM. U. J.
INT'L L. POL'Y 1, 45 (1996); Laura Ho, Catherine Powell & Leti Volpp,
(Dis)Assembling Rights of Women Workers Along the Global Assembly Line:
Human Rights and the Garment Industry, 31 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 383, 392
(1996).
142. TREATY ON EUROPEAN UNION Protocol No. 14 on Social Policy, annexed
to the EC TREATY, reprinted in EUROPEAN UNION LAW GUIDE 253 (Philip
Raworth ed., 1996).
143. North American Agreement on Labor Cooperation, Dec. 17, 1992, U.S.-
Mex.-Can., Pub. L. No. 103-182, 107 Stat. 2057, reprinted in 32 I.L.M. 1499
(1993). See also Juli Stensland, Internationalizing the North American Agree-
ment on Labor Cooperation, 4 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 141 (1995); Laura 0.
Pomeroy, The Labor Side Agreement under the NAFTA: Analysis of its Failure
to Include Strong Enforcement Provisions and Recommendations for Future La-
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isterial conference in Singapore, the United States and the Eu-
ropean Union proposed a "social clause" amendment as a "social
chapter"144 to provide minimum standards within this area of
GATT. 145 The debate surrounding social standards or condi-
tions, particularly the denial of basic worker rights or the use of
child labor, provided the impetus for this amendment. 146 Sev-
eral developing countries opposed this proposal, arguing that
any link between social standards and trade would result in pro-
tectionist measures that would overburden the developing coun-
tries. 147 The Singapore Ministerial Declaration establishes the
International Labor Organization as "the competent body to set
and deal with [labor] standards."148
bor Agreements Negotiated with Developing Countries, 29 G.W. J. INT'L L. &
ECON. 769 (1996); Lance Compa, Going Multilateral: The Evolution of US Hem-
ispheric Labor Rights Policy under GSP and NAFTA, 10 CONN. J. INT'L L. 337,
365, 379, 403, 427, 533 (1995).
144. Leary, supra note 141, at 178; Mary Van Lieshout, The Most Conten-
tious Issue Facing the World Trade Organisation This Week Will Be Demands to
Enforce Labour Rights Through Trade Agreements, THE OBSERVER, Dec. 8,
1996.
145. See Alice Enders, The Role of the WTO in Minimum Standards in
CHALLENGES TO THE NEW WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION 61 (Pitou van Dijck &
Gerrit Faber eds., 1996).
146. Michael Richardson, WTO Is Set to Grapple With Rights of Workers 'So-
cial Clause' Looms As Contentious Issue at Singapore Meeting, INT'L HERALD
TRIB., Dec. 9, 1996.
147. Grossmann & Koopmann, supra note 141, at 130; Jeff Atkinson, The
Rights of the World's Workers are a Major Trade Issue, INT'L HERALD TRIB., Dec.
5, 1996; Malaysian Minister Attacks on Several WTO Fronts, AGENCE FRANCE
PRESSE, Dec. 11, 1996, available in WESTLAW, ALLNEWS File; Richardson,
supra note 146; Trade Policy: EU Council Agrees Guidelines for WTO Ministe-
rial Conference, EUROPEAN REPORT, Oct. 31, 1996; available in WESTLAW,
ALLNEWS File. The Federation of Indian Exporters' Association stated that
the increasing trend towards establishing a "social clause" was discharging im-
ports from India. Indian Export Chamber Flays Non-Tariff Barriers, ASIA
PULSE, Feb. 14, 1997.
Britain and Germany were the only members of the EU which opposed this
proposal. See Developed States Differ over Social Clause, JAKARTA POST, Dec.
10, 1996, available in WESTLAW, ALLNEWS File; Van Lieshout, supra note
144. See also Abraham Katz, WTO and the Social Clause, J. COM., Jan. 8, 1997.
148. Singapore Ministerial Declaration, Dec. 13, 1996, Ministerial Confer-
ence of the World Trade Organization, at § 4.
The International Labour Organization regards the following as fundamen-
tal human rights in the working world, as elaborated in several conventions:
freedom of association and protection of the right to organize (Convention No.
87 [July 9, 1948], ratified by 119 states), right to organize and collective bar-
gaining (Convention No. 98 [July 1, 19491, ratified by 133 states), suppression
of forced or compulsory labor in all its forms (Convention No. 29 [June 28,
1930], ratified by 143 states) and as a means of political or other coercion (Con-
vention No. 105 [June 25, 1957], ratified by 120 states), elimination of any dis-
crimination in access to or during employment (Convention No. 111 [June 25,
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Provisions dealing explicitly with certain social standards
or conditions can be found neither in any draft of the GATT nor
in the GATT itself.149 In the past, contracting parties tried to
compensate for the absence of social standards by threatening to
suspend benefits, derived from the Generalized System of Pref-
erences, to less-developed countries which ignored a minimum
level of social standards' 50 or by invoking other GATT provi-
sions which could enforce a de minimis standard.' 5 ' There may
be a risk in applying Article XX(a) to countries with low or non-
existent social standards, assuming that "public morals" could
be extended to areas of social policy.' 52 However, the most con-
vincing argument for setting certain social and labor standards
appears not be an economic, but a moral argument. 53
C. ORDINARY MEANING
The interpretation of Article XX(a) greatly depends on the
interpretation of the term "public morals." According to Article
1958], ratified by 123 states), equal pay for men and women for work of equal
value (Convention No. 100 [July 29, 19511, ratified by 127 states), certain mini-
mum age for admission to employment (Convention No. 138 [June 26, 1973],
ratified by 51 states).
149. Frederick M. Abbott, International Trade and Social Welfare: The New
Agenda, 17 COMP. LAB. L.J. 338 (1996); Daniel S. Ehrenberg, The Labor Link:
Applying the International Trading System to Enforce Violations of Forced and
Child Labor, 20 YALE J. INT'L L. 361, 394 (1995); Ho, Powell & Volpp, supra
note 141, at 398; Robert Howse & Michael Trebilcock, The Fair Trade - Free
Trade Debate: Trade, Labor, and the Environment, 16 INT'L REV. L. & EcoN. 61
(1996); Leary, supra note 141, at 177; Juli Stensland, supra note 143, at 148;
Sterling, supra note 141, at 37.
150. See Thomas Schoenbaum, International Trade and Social Welfare: The
New Agenda, 17 COMP. LAB. L.J. 338, 350 (1996) (giving an overview of actions
by the United States); ICFTU Welcomes EU's Decision on Burmese Trade Privi-
leges, REUTER EUR. CoM. REP., Mar. 25, 1997, available in LEXIS/NEXIS,
CURNWS File.
151. Cf. Panel on "United States - Restrictions on Imports of Cotton and
Man-Made Fibre Underwear," Nov. 8, 1996, § 5.9, available in WESTLAW,
GATT File (outlining the U.S.'s attempt to justify an Escape Clause proceeding
under GATT Article XIX by arguing that Costa Rica's "lower-priced foreign
fabric" was causing serious injury to the domestic industry). See also Ehren-
berg, supra note 150, at 392 (supporting the applicability of provisions dealing
with the two major unfair trade practices in GATT/WTO in this context, dump-
ing and subsidies); Johanna Son, Trade-Labor: Study Debunks Social Clause
Theory, INTER PRESS SERVICE, Sept. 5, 1996, available in WESTLAW,
ALLNEWS File.
152. PETERSMANN, supra note 100, at 51. The ILO proposed a link between
international trade and workers' rights by an amendment to GATT Art. XX.
See Sterling, supra note 141, at 37.
153. David Crane, Labor-Rights Issue Divides Trade Summit, THE TORONTO
STAR, Dec. 10, 1996.
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31(1) of the Vienna Convention, interpretation must start with
the ordinary meaning of "public morals."1 54 Neither Article XX
nor any other GATT provision contain a legal definition of the
term "public morals." The term "public morals" can be seen as
including those rules and principles in a given society which
both characterize conduct as right or wrong and stipulate the
behavioral norms in that society. 155 While all contracting par-
ties would agree on the same formal definition of "public
morals," nothing has been said about the material content of
public morals. Material content means which rules or principles
are or should be included by the term. Material content also ad-
dresses whether public morals refers to the well-known legal
concept of public order or public policy used in civil and common
law systems. It is most likely that different rules or principles
will be considered, depending upon the particular contracting
parties' social, cultural and political systems and experiences.
Unfortunately, the text of the GATT remains silent on this ques-
tion. Thus, the ordinary meaning of "public morals" remains
open and ambiguous. An interpretation based on the ordinary
meaning of the term "public morals" could lead to a blanket
clause with an overly broad scope and countless meanings. 56
Article XX(a)'s language itself indicates, however, some
limits in the determination of the material content and scope of
"public morals." If this were not the case, GATT perhaps may
have adopted different language allowing contracting parties to
use their individual national standards as a basis for determin-
ing public morals under Article XX(a).15 7
With respect to the EEC regulation on pelts and fur, the
ambiguous ordinary meaning of Article XX(a) does not reveal
anything about the Article's applicability to methods of produc-
tion or processing standards of a product. Instead, this ambigu-
ity allows the broad meaning of "public morals" to possibly
encompass certain standards of behavior and conduct which
might lead to guidelines for production methods. The ordinary
meaning could support an interpretation which includes produc-
tion methods considered immoral by a contracting party. There-
154. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, opened for signature, May
23, 1969. Article 31(1) 1155 U.N.T.S 331 [hereinafter Vienna Convention].
155. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1008 (6th ed. 1990); see also 7 THE ENCYCLO-
PEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY 155, 5 THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY 385 (Paul Ed-
wards ed., 1967).
156. McGovERN, supra note 91, § 13.12; PETERSMANN, supra note 100, at 51.
157. But see SENTI, supra note 100, at 275 ("the definition of... morals is
left to the contracting parties").
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fore, the ordinary meaning of Article XX(a) could justify
restrictions imposed on the use of "cruel" or "inhumane" produc-
tion methods like the EEC regulation on pelts and fur.'
58
Interpreting Article XX(a) based on its ordinary meaning
may shed light on the possible inclusion of a "social clause" in
Article XX(a). Because the ordinary meaning of the term "public
morals" remains ambiguous, one could argue that certain social
standards or conditions are to be regarded as immoral and thus,
corresponding restrictions on behalf of such unsocial and im-
moral conditions are justifiable under Article XX(a). i5 9
In conclusion, Article XX(a)'s ordinary meaning does not re-
veal very much about the possible interpretation of the phrase
"public morals." The language, however, confirms that the defi-
nition of the term is at least not limitlessly open to any national
standard of individual contracting parties.
D. CONTEXT
Article 31(1) of the Vienna Convention stipulates that the
context of Article XX(a) must also be taken into account when
interpreting the provision. Article XX allows GATT members to
circumvent their obligations through exceptions related to their
individual public policies. In addition to paragraph (a), Article
XX provides exceptions for the protection of human, animal or
plant life or health, exportation or importation of gold or silver,
products of prison labor, protection of national treasures, and
conservation of exhaustible natural resources.
Article XX outlines each exception separately. One could
argue, argumentum e contrario, that this is strong evidence that
every section of Article XX is supposed to have its own and in-
dependent meaning. Accordingly, if the scope of one section is
not limited by the scope of another section it would have been
unnecessary and useless to include sections with partially or to-
tally overlapping scopes. Thus, it could be argued that the term
"public morals" excludes those measures enumerated in the
other paragraphs of Article XX. Otherwise, either section (a) or
one of the other sections becomes superfluous, at least to the ex-
tent the scopes of each section overlap.
While this contextual interpretation is probably correct in
the national and statutory context of civil law countries, GATT
does not constitute a legal framework of comparable consistency
158. See also PETERSMANN, supra note 100, at 51.
159. Id.
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and relative accuracy. GATT unites similarities of national civil
law countries in an international organization; it has a general
statutory basis and independent (quasi-) judicial bodies inter-
preting this basis in a supranational context. 160 This interna-
tional context necessitates more flexibility and dynamic
interpretation than one could ever imagine in a relatively con-
sistent and static civil law system. Accordingly, methods of con-
textual interpretation of national law that provide satisfactory
answers when they are used in civil law countries do not neces-
sarily provide correct answers in the supranational context of
GATT, even when they are applied without any modification.
Thus, one could also argue that in some situations the scope of
two Article XX paragraphs can overlap even though all excep-
tions have an independent and simultaneous existence in Article
XX. If the penumbras of two sections can at least partially cover
the same factual situation, one section may be rendered ineffec-
tive to the extent the scopes of the sections overlap.
For instance, environmental measures dealing with human,
animal and plant life or health definitely fall under section (b).
Because section (a) and (b) are both provisions of Article XX and,
assuming that every section of Article XX is supposed to have its
own independent meaning, one could argue that the scope of sec-
tion (a) does not include measures which fall under section (b).
Any justification for the measure under section (a) would be
foreclosed in that case.
A strong argument may be made for the opposite position.
A measure aimed at the protection of human, animal or plant
life or health, falling under section (b), could also be considered
to be justifiable under section (a) as protecting public morals. In
other words, protection of human, animal or plant life or health
simply coincides with protection of public morals. The measure
could be aimed at one public policy goal covered by the penum-
bras of sections (a) and (b) simultaneously.
In addition, a contracting party is not precluded from the
procedural strategy of invoking one section of Article XX to jus-
tify a measure while invoking another section in the alternative.
Efficient operation of the dispute settlement process demands
160. Thus, the relationship between rulings and law-making by quasi-judi-
cial bodies in the framework of the WTO dispute settlement system and legal
rules of written GATT-law appears to resemble the common problem of judge-
made law in civil law countries, at least to a certain extent. Accordingly, the
discussion regarding legal effects of adopted panel reports should focus more on
this similarity than on exclusively drawing parallels to legal effects of case law
in common law countries. See also supra notes 63-68 and accompanying text.
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that a contracting party bring as many facts and legal argu-
ments as it deems necessary for the panel to consider. Were this
not the case, a contracting party could neither make its strong-
est case nor bring all its legal arguments to the consideration of
the Appellate Body. 16 1 Thus, the goal of efficient GATT dispute
settlement procedures demands the possibility of an alternative
pleading before the panel. 16 2
1. The EEC regulation on pelts and fur - Revisited
The context of Article XX does not provide definite evidence
that any of its sections apply to products alone or whether they
apply to production methods as well. For example, the language
of Article XX(b) mentions nothing about its application to meth-
ods of production. Based on the wording of this section, how-
ever, one could assume that measures taken with regard to
certain production methods could be justifiable. Article XX(e) is
the only provision that explicitly deals with the production
method of a product. Allowing measures "relating to prison la-
bor," this section explicitly focuses on products which were
processed in prisons of another contracting party. It allows
measures to prevent the importation of those products based on
their production methods and presumed "social dumping."' 6 3
One could argue that, because Article XX(e) is the only provision
with a "social agenda" and was found to be of such importance, it
had to be explicitly included in the final text of GATT.16 4 Con-
versely, the fact that Article XX(e) is the only provision explicitly
addressing production methods strongly indicates that the other
Article XX sections were not intended to include measures based
on production methods. Viewed in this way, the context of Arti-
161. In the appellate phase of GATT dispute settlement, a party may only
bring arguments that are limited to the issues of law and legal interpretations
discussed by the panel in its report. DSU, supra note 31, art. 17(6).
162. Tuna I, supra note 48, § 5.22.
163. Cf the opinion of the French Delegation in UNITED NATIONS, PREPARA-
TORY COMMITTEE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON TRADE AND DEVELOP-
MENT, COMMITTEE II, TECHNICAL SuB-COMMIrTEE, at 8, U.N. Doc. E/PC/T/C.II/
12, (Oct. 26, 1946) (explaining that the French legislature does not prohibit
prison-made goods because it does not have any penalties for social dumping).
For a discussion of social dumping, see generally Ehrenberg, supra note 149, at
379.
164. Further evidence supporting this assumption could be found in the dis-
cussion of an amendment to Article 43 dealing with social dumping, which was
finally rejected. See Report of Sub-Committee D on Articles 40, 41, 43, U.N.
Conference on Trade and Employment, Third Committee: Commercial Policy,
at 4, U.N. Doc. E/CONF.2/C.3/37, (Jan. 20, 1948).
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cle XX does not provide justification for the EEC regulation on
pelts and fur under section (a).
2. Inclusion of a "social clause:" - Revisited
As stated earlier, Article XX contains no provision dealing
with certain social standards that would extend "public morals"
to areas of social policy. The only provision somewhat related to
this idea which persistently appeared in the drafts165 and which
was ultimately included in GATT is Article XX(e). As mentioned
above, it explicitly provides an exception for measures "relating
to prison labor." If Article XX(e) is viewed as allowing measures
related to certain social standards or conditions, it is the only
provision found to be so important that it had to be explicitly
included in the final text of GATT. It may be argued that if Arti-
cle XX(e) is the only explicit provision in this area, there is
strong evidence that, argumentum e contrario, no further rules
dealing with social policy can be implicitly read into the blanket
clause of Article XX(a).
E. OBJECT AND PURPOSE
According to Article 31(1) of the Vienna Convention, the ob-
ject and purpose of Article XX(a) must also be examined. This
subsection first outlines the dichotomy of Article XX's object and
purpose in order to show its consequences at the intersection of
interpretation and quasi-judicial review. Further, the subsec-
tion examines the examples of fur regulation and a social clause
in light of Article XX's object and purpose.
1. Dichotomy of the object and purpose of Article XX
Article XX enables individual contracting parties to deviate
from their GATT obligations if necessary to effectuate their na-
tional public policies. The effect of Article XX is to give prece-
dence to a contracting party's national sovereignty over GATT's
commitments to trade liberalization.16 6 Panel reports have gen-
165. See infra APPENDIX, GENESIS OF ARTICLE XX(a) GATT; U.S. Proposals,
supra note 16, at III G 6 (p.18); US Draft Charter, supra note 17, Article 32(h);
London Draft Charter, supra note 18, Article 37(h); New York Draft Charter,
supra note 19, Article 37(h); Geneva Draft Charter, supra note 20, Article 43(e);
Havana Charter, supra note 21, Article 45:1(a)(vi).
166. PETERSMANN, supra note 100, at 30; Robert E. Hudec, GATT - Legal
Status in U.S. Domestic Law, in THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY AND GATT 239
(Meinhard Hilf et al. eds., 1986); Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, The European Eco-
nomic Community as a GATT Member, in THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY AND
GATT 26 (Meinhard Hilf et al. eds., 1986); Sorsa, supra note 46, at 329.
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erally elucidated Article XX's object and purpose. For example,
the panel on "Thailand - Restrictions on Importation of and In-
ternal Taxes on Cigarettes" affirmed the object and purpose of
Article XX by stating that section (b) allows parties to "give pri-
ority to human health over trade liberalization," if the other re-
quirements of the provision are met. 167 The Panel on "Canada -
Measures Affecting Exports of Unprocessed Herring and
Salmon" concluded that Article XX(g)'s purpose is to ensure that
GATT commitments do not hinder or burden national policies
pursued by a contracting party.168 The Panel on "United States
- Restrictions on Imports of Tuna (Tuna I)" found that Article
XX permits an individual contracting party to use import re-
strictions in the pursuit of overriding public policy goals. 169
In contrast, the General Agreement, as its title literally in-
dicates, requires a certain level of general consensus and uni-
form interpretation among the contracting parties. 170 GATT's
trading system would seriously malfunction if a contracting
party could simply circumvent its obligations by invoking an Ar-
ticle XX public policy exception based merely on the country's
own national standard. The term "contracting parties" would
inevitably turn into "contrasting parties"17 1 and GATT as a
whole would become ad absurdum. Methodologically, it would
be erroneous to interpret an international multilingual treaty
based solely on the interpretation of an individual nation's legal
order, if the treaty itself lacked such an interpretation. 72
This dichotomy between a mere national interpretation to
protect the sovereignty of an individual contracting party and
the minimum standard of agreement on internationally and
supranationally binding obligations crystallizes the difficulty in
interpreting the object and purpose of Article XX. This analysis
shows that neither end of the spectrum can coincide with the
object and purpose of Article XX to provide a satisfying result.
167. Thai Cigarettes, supra note 48, § 73.
168. Unprocessed Herring and Salmon, supra note 90, § 4.6.
169. Tuna I, supra note 48, § 5.27.
170. See Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, International Economic Theory and In-
ternational Economic Law: On the Tasks of a Legal Theory of International Eco-
nomic Order, in THE STRUCTURE AND PROCESS OF INTERNATIONAL LAw 243 (R.
St. J. MacDonald & Douglas M. Johnston eds., 1983).
171. The (almost?) Freudian slip "CONTRASTING PARTIES" can be found
in Christopher Thomas, Litigation Process under the GATT Dispute Settlement
System, 30 J. OF WORLD TRADE 64 (1996).
172. MEINHARD HILF, DIE AUSLEGUNG MEHRSPRACHIGER VERTRAGE 86
(1973).
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2. "Public morals" as an indefinite term
The phrase "public morals" can be interpreted according to
neither national nor international standards, which leaves the
meaning of the phrase open to a broad range of interpretations.
Numerous other provisions throughout GATT contain similar
ambiguous phrases. 173 For instance, neither the context nor the
object of Article VI:1 reveals much about the possible meaning
or scope of the phrase "material injury." The Agreement on Sub-
sidies and Countervailing Measures, however, prevents an ex-
pansive range of interpretations by defining the phrase in
Article 15.174 An interpretative note to that Article makes it
clear that the term "material injury" must be interpreted accord-
ing to the standards and criteria defined there. 175 Article XJX
contains a similar legal caveat; its terms must be interpreted in
accordance with the provisions found in the Agreement on
Safeguards.176
Unfortunately, there are no specific guidelines for the inter-
pretation and application of the phrase "public morals." A panel
examining the application of Article XX(a) in an individual case
cannot rely on authoritative guidelines provided by the con-
tracting parties. 177 Instead, a panel must interpret this phrase
on its own. The panel must take into account the object and pur-
pose of Article XX - protection of national sovereignty 178 while
maintaining the interpretative uniformity that is indispensable
for the health of internationally binding agreements. 179 The
panel must consider the national interpretation of a contracting
173. Cf. BENEDEK, supra note 49, at 396; FRANK SCHOCH, UNBESTIMMTE
RECHTSBEGRIFFE IM RAHMEN DES GATT (1994).
174. See Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, opened for
signature Apr. 15, 1994, GATT Secretariat, The Results of the Uruguay Round
of Multilateral Trade Negotiations 264, GATT Sales No. 1994-4 (1994) (Art.
15.7 lists factors used to be determining the existence of material injury).
175. Id.
176. See Agreement on Safeguards, reprinted in United States Trade Repre-
sentatives, Final Texts of the GATT Uruguay Round Agreements Including the
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization 264 [hereinafter Final
Texts].
177. See McGOVERN, supra note 91, § 13.12.
178. PETERSMANN, supra note 100, at 29-30; Steven P. Croley & John H.
Jackson, WTO Dispute Procedures, Standard of Review, and Deference to Na-
tional Governments, 90 AM. J. INT'L L. 193, 205 (1996). See also Bello, supra
note 27, at 417 (stating that the flexibility of WTO/GAIT allows for national
sovereignty while still promoting international trade).
179. Croley & Jackson, supra note 178, at 205; Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann,
supra note 166, at 243.
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party within the limits which GATT itself sets.180 These limits
must be reduced to a common denominator accepted by all con-
tracting parties and shared by a majority. These limits set the
outside boundaries of the phrase "public morals" and leave only
a small margin within which the individual contracting party
can define the term.181
Two kinds of possible interpretations exist within these pa-
rameters of construction. Under the first interpretation, one
phrase is uniformly and identically interpreted by all con-
tracting parties. This unanimous interpretation would likely lie
at the heart of the phrase. Measures aimed at this "core inter-
pretation" would not likely encounter problems with the dispute
settlement procedure.' 8 2 A second interpretation could be that
the phrase "public morals" includes different interpretations
depending upon the individual contracting party invoking and
interpreting Article XX. These potentially different inter-
pretations would fall simultaneously under section (a) and its
penumbras, provided they fall within the absolute outer limits
set by GATT. In a dispute settlement proceeding, this interpre-
tation could only be subject to limited judicial review by a panel
because it enjoys a limited degree of deference. The panel could
only find a violation of this margin of interpretation (and thus of
the provisional standard of section (a)) if the contracting party
itself acted beyond the scope of its own interpretation in obvious
cases. Otherwise, the panel would deny the individual con-
tracting party any latitude in applying Article XX. This could
occur when the contracting party applying Article XX based its
interpretation on false or inaccurate facts or simply misinter-
preted the provision.18 3
This limited standard of review is not new in the GATT/
WTO context. It is described in Article 17.6 of the Agreement on
180. Cf. Croley & Jackson, supra note 178, at 205 (suggesting that by focus-
ing on national interpretation, individual parties will have more authority in
the determination of a dispute).
181. See Edmund McGovern, Dispute Settlement in the GATT - Adjudica-
tion or Negotiation? in THE EuRoPEAN COMMUNITY AND GATT 73, 80 (Meinhard
Hilf et al. eds., 1986).
182. SCHOCH, supra note 173, at 57.
183. This legal construction of the term "public morals" is consistent with
the necessary flexibility of the General Agreement, which is structured on a
system of obligations that exists between a "policy-based" and "rule-based" sys-
tem. Cf Singapore Ministerial Declaration, supra note 148, at § 1 ("We, the
Ministers have met . . . to further . . . the continuing liberalization of trade
within a rule-based system...").
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Implementation of Article VI of the General Agreement on Tar-
iffs and Trade 1994, which provides:
. .. In examining the [establishment of a panel by the DSB at the re-
quest of a complaining party]
G) in its assessment of the facts of the matter, the panel shall deter-
mine whether the authorities' establishment of the fact was proper
and whether their evaluation of those facts was unbiased and ob-
jective. If the establishment of the facts was proper and the evalu-
ation was unbiased and objective, even though the panel might
have reached a different conclusion, the evaluation shall not be
overturned;
(ii) the panel shall interpret the relevant provisions of the Agreement
in accordance with customary rules of interpretation of public in-
ternational law. Where the panel finds that a relevant provision of
the Agreement admits of more than one permissible interpretation,
the panel shall find the authorities' measure to be in conformity
with the Agreement if it rests upon one of those permissible
interpretations. 1
84
Thus, in reviewing the conclusions of prior panels, a panel can-
not strike down an interpretation which is premised on rational
and sensible factual and legal bases, even though the panel
might have reached a different, equally plausible conclusion.
It could be argued that this process applies exclusively to
Article VI since there is no special agreement on the implemen-
tation of Article XX. i8 5 On the other hand, this contextual argu-
ment is not as convincing in the GATT/WTO context as it would
be in a domestic context of a civil law country1i 6 Rather, Article
17.6 of the Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of GATT
1994 demonstrates there is a particular method to interpreting
indefinite terms within the framework of GATT. Such a method
lies at the intersection of a contracting party's national sover-
eignty with the minimum of a uniform interpretation of an in-
ternationally binding agreement.
184. See Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the General Agree-
ment on Tariffs and Trade 1994, opened for signature Apr. 15, 1994, art. 17(6)
reprinted in Final Texts, supra note 176.
185. Cf Panel Report on "United States - Measure Affecting Imports of Wo-
ven Wool Shirts and Blouses from India", January 6, 1997, WTO-Doc. WT/
DS33/R, § 5.7 (stating India's similar opinion). The Appellate Body Report,
however, fails to address this topic. See Appellate Body Report on "United
States - Measure Affecting Imports of Woven Wool Shirts and Blouses from
India", April 25, 1997, WTO-Doc. WT/DS33/AB/R.
186. See supra Part III.D.
[Vol. 7:75
PUBLIC MORALs IN GA.TTARTiCLE X'(a)
3. "Core" interpretation of "public morals"
The legal character of the phrase "public morals" indicates a
"core" interpretation of that phrase which is shared and agreed
upon by all or a vast majority of the contracting parties. Such a
core interpretation of the object and purpose of the phrase "pub-
lic morals" could include the restriction of imports considered in-
decent, because every contracting party has a moral interest in
restricting imports of indecent material.18 7 As such, indecent
products, such as pornographic literature or movies, could be
viewed as central to the meaning of Article XX(a). 88 However,
the standards of indecency can vary between individual con-
tracting parties. It has been suggested that Article XX(a) allows
the individual contracting party to limit or ban the importation
of print media, literature, movies, and videotapes found to be
indecent under its domestic standard.18 9 For example, Section
305 of the Tariff Act of 1930 prohibits the importation of any
obscene materials into the U.S.19 ° The obscenity of imported
materials is determined by applying a national standard.191
Basing the indecent character of a product solely on a national
standard, however, would cause "public morals" to be an indefi-
nite term. Article XX(a) does leave the definition of indecent
material open to the determination of the individual contracting
party, but only to the extent allowed by GATT. Applying the
national standard to the determination of indecent material is
acceptable and complies with Article XX when that standard
falls within the prescribed limits.
187. The problem of sexually explicit goods of artistic value has not been
examined by legal scholarship on international art trade in context with Article
XX(a). Rather, it has been addressed with regard to Article XX(f) which allows
export restrictions "... imposed for the protection of national treasures or artis-
tic, historic or archaeological value." See Pierre Lalive, Le Projet de Convention
de l'UNIDROIT Sur les Bigns Culturels Volgs ou Illicitement Exportds, in 4 IN-
TERNATIONAL ART TRADE AND LAw 35, Martine Briat & Judith A. Freedberg
eds., 1993); Robert Lecat & Van Kirk Reeves, The Regulatory Framework for the
Free International Circulation of Objects of Art, in 4 INTERNATIONAL ART TRADE
AND LAw 58 (Martine Briat & Judith A. Freedberg eds., 1993).
188. Cf SENTI, supra note 100, at 275.
189. Id.
190. Tariff Act of 1930, 19 U.S.C. § 305 (1930). According to a decision of the
Supreme Court, Section 305 is not unconstitutionally overbroad on First
Amendment grounds; see United States v. 12,200-Ft. Reels of Super 8mm Film,
413 U.S. 125, 129 (1973).
191. In Miller v. California, the U.S. Supreme Court held that judicial re-
view adequately protects First Amendment rights and therefore a state stan-
dard may be constitutional. 413 U.S. 15 (1993).
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4. The EEC regulation on pelts and fur and the inclusion of a
social clause revisited
The regulation of pelts and fur aims to prevent "inhumane"
trapping standards. Because the European Community already
prohibits leg-hold traps within its own borders, the prohibition
of non-complying imports effectively acts as an "export" of the
standard to other contracting parties. Thus, the leg-hold trap
regulation faces a similar situation to that found in the Tuna-
Dolphin dispute - whether Article XX can justify prescriptive
measures which take effect outside the territory of the acting
contracting party.'9 2 Both Panels reporting on the Tuna-
Dolphin dispute rejected the assertion that Article XX permits
the application of measures with extrajurisdictional effects or
which could force another contracting party to change its poli-
cies. 193 The Tuna I Panel stated that
.. [if] each contracting party could unilaterally determine [the stan-
dards at issue] ... the General Agreement would... no longer consti-
tute a multilateral framework for trade among all contracting parties
but would provide legal security only in respect of trade between a lim-
ited number of contracting parties with identical internal
regulations. 1
9 4
The panel essentially found that the "export" of internal
regulations of one contracting party to other contracting parties
would jeopardize trade liberalization with respect to the stan-
192. See Tuna I, supra note 48, § 5.32, 5.27, with regard to Article XX(b) and
(g) (holding that Article XX allows a contracting party to set its own standards).
See also Tuna II, supra note 48, § 5.26. Article XX(b) and (g) could apply to
measures taking effect outside of a contracting party's jurisdiction; however,
these sections do not cover boycotts taken to force other countries to change
their policies and which were effective only if such changes occurred. See JACK-
SON, supra note 56, at 343 (stating that block adoption should prevent unilat-
eral U.S. actions).
193. See also JACKSON, supra note 14, at 209 (stating that Article XX prohib-
its disguised restrictions); John Bogardus, The GATT and the Environment: Ir-
reconcilable Differences?, 5 DALHOUSIE J. OF LEGAL STUDIES 237, 240 (1996)
(stating Article XX allows the use of trade restrictions for environmental pur-
poses); Steve Charnovitz, Dolphins and Tuna: An Analysis of the Second GATT
Panel Report, 24 ENvTL. L. REP. 10567, 10568 (1994) (explaining that the type
of measure should be central to determining whether it is inconsistent); Ted L.
McDorman, The GATT Inconsistency of US Fish Import Embargoes to Stop
Driftnet Fishing and Save Whales, Dolphins and Turtles, 24 GEO. WASH. J.
INT'L L. & ECON. 477, 517 (1991) (suggesting that the goal of U.S. law is to
influence other countries' environmental policies). For an economic point of
view see Bernhard Hoekman & Michael Leidy, Environmental Policy Forma-
tion in a Trading Economy: A Public Choice Perspective, in THE GREENING OF
WORLD TRADE ISSUES 227 (Kym Anderson & Richard Blackhurst eds. 1992) (dis-
cussing trade measures used to promote environmental policies).
194. Tuna I, supra note 48, § 5.27.
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dard at issue, because unencumbered trade as provided by
GATT could only take place between contracting parties having
identical standards in a given area.
The second Panel examining the Tuna-Dolphin dispute ba-
sically affirmed this interpretation. The second Panel, however,
made different findings on the issue of "extra-territoriality." It
stated that no contracting party could coerce another con-
tracting party to change the latter's policies within its own juris-
diction. 195 This Panel, however, arrived at its conclusion
without repeating the first Panel's observations regarding an
"extrajurisdictional application" of Article XX.
Although neither report was adopted, it is highly doubtful
that Article XX could allow a different result. Article XX pro-
vides a public policy which acts as a safeguard for each con-
tracting party's national sovereignty.196 Allowing a party to use
Article XX to impose measures which take effect in another con-
tracting party's territory would infringe upon that party's na-
tional sovereignty and provide an absurd result.
Article XX permits a contracting party to pursue its own
public policy goals; by the same token, Article XX cannot allow a
contracting party to dictate another contracting party's public
policy goals. Considering the object and purpose of Article XX,
one could argue that neither the European Community's regula-
tion on pelts and fur nor an extended interpretation of "public
morals" to areas of social policy can be justified under Article
XX(a). 197
F. A SUPPLEMENTARY MEANS: TRAVA _rXPREPARATOIRES 198
According to Article 32 of the Vienna Convention, the draft-
ing history of Article XX can be used as a supplementary means
of interpreting the phrase "public morals." During the Article
XX negotiations, the participating states made numerous unsuc-
cessful attempts to support their own national political agendas
195. Tuna II, supra note 48, § 5.26.
196. Petersmann, supra note 166, at 26. See supra Part III.E.1.
197. To allow for both the EC's regulation on pelts and furs and an extended
interpretation of the phrase "public morals," Article XX would have to be explic-
itly amended. Alternatively, an interpretative understanding, permitting ex-
emption from GATT obligation, would have to be negotiated. See MICHAEL J.
TREBILCOCK & ROBERT HOWSE, THE REGULATION OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE 412
(1995).
198. To gain a better understanding of this subsection, see infra APPENDIX,
GENESIS OF ARTICLE XX(a) GATT.
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by modifying the exceptions clauses. 19 9 At the same time, the
term "public morals" appeared in the drafts. The negotiating
states could not reach a compromise on the inclusion of any such
provisions. The fact that debates over these rejected amend-
ments occurred contemporaneously with the inclusion of Article
XX(a) may indicate that politically motivated measures are not
intended to fall under Article XX(a).
Every draft of Article XX, beginning with the original U.S.-
Proposal, contained an exception for measures "necessary to pro-
tect public morals."20 0 This indicates that the drafters agreed
on the importance of such an exception, but could not agree on
an unambiguous statement of what "public morals" was sup-
posed to mean. The preparatory work may reveal that there was
no unanimous interpretation of the phrase when it was included
in Article XX. Although the Drafting Committee realized the in-
clusion of a provision defining obscure or ambiguous terms in
the Exceptions Clause would be helpful,20 1 no definitions were
codified in the final draft.
The preparatory work is clear, however, with respect to
whether the phrase "public morals" is considered identical to the
legal concept of ordre public (public order). Public order is a con-
flict-of-laws rule relevant when jurisdictional problems occur be-
tween states. 20 2 Based on the international law principle that
no state has jurisdiction over acts of another state, courts of one
state are usually not competent to examine the lawfulness of an-
other state's action, at least as long as the latter state acted
within its jurisdiction and acts other than acts jure gestionis are
concerned (acts jure imperii).20 3 Even so, courts of one state
might refuse to follow laws of another state if such laws violate
the former state's public order.20 4
199. See infra notes 209-216 and accompanying text.
200. U.S.-Proposals, supra note 16, at Ch. III G 1. (p.18); US Draft Charter,
supra note 17, Article 32(a); London Draft Charter, supra note 18, Article 37(a);
New York Draft Charter, supra note 19, Article 37(a); Geneva Draft Charter,
supra note 20, Article 43 (a); Havana Charter, supra note 21, Article 45:1(a)(i).
201. Report of the Technical Sub-Committee, United Nations Preparatory
Committee of the International Conference on Trade and Development, Com-
mittee II, at 7, U.N. Doc. E/PC/TC.II/64 (Nov. 22, 1946) and at 38, U.N. Doc. E/
PC/T/C.II/54/Rev.1 (Nov. 28, 1946).
202. "The civilian doctrine of ordre public concerns itself only with excep-
tional or highly significant manifestations of foreign sovereign will." COVEY T.
OLIVER ET AL., THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL SYSTEM 624 (1995).
203. See BROWNLIE, supra note 71, at 332; SHAw, supra note 68, at 374.
204. GERHARD KEGEL, INTERNATIONALES PRIVATRECHT 324 (1987); HANS
KELSEN, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 240 (1952).
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If the term "public morals" were identical to the legal con-
cept of ordre public, Article XX(a) would provide a justification
for restrictions on an imported product that would otherwise be
in contradiction with the national legal order of the importing
country. In other words, the individual contracting party would
control the interpretation of "public morals," which would be in-
directly executed by its national legal order.
Strong evidence, based on the travaux preparatoires, indi-
cates that a country's national legal order was to remain concep-
tually separate from "public morals." Article 45, section 1(a)(ii)
of the Havana Charter provided an exception for measures "nec-
essary to the enforcement of laws and regulations relating to
public safety."20 5 Even though the phrase included the legal
concept of ordre public,20 6 it was considered to be separate from
the concept of "public morals." The drafts included in Article 45,
section 1(a)(i) an exception for measures "necessary to protect
public morals."20 7 Significantly, the Working Party on Modifica-
tions to the General Agreement decided not to include Article 45
section 1(a)(ii) or a similar provision into the General Agree-
ment.208 Therefore, the drafting history indicates that the
phrase "public morals" cannot be interpreted as being identical
to the legal concept of ordre public. In this sense, the travaux
preparatoires could be considered a rejection of leaving limitless
power to the individual contracting parties to define "public
morals."
The drafting history of Article XX reveals at least one inter-
pretation which the phrase "public morals" does not encompass.
The Norwegian delegate to the Drafting Committee stated his
country's tax and price restrictions on the importation and sale
of alcoholic beverages were chiefly aimed at "the promotion of
temperance."20 9 In the delegate's opinion, the taxation and
205. See infra Article 45(1)(a) in APPENDIX, GENESIS OF ARTICLE XX(a)
GATT. See also Havana Charter, supra note 21, art. 45(1)(a)(i).
206. Report of Sub-Committee D on Articles 40, 41, 43, U.N. Conference on
Trade and Employment, Third Committee: Commercial Policy, at 3, U.N. Doc.
E/CONF.2/C.3/37 (Jan. 28, 1948) and Reports of Committees and Principal Sub-
Committees, United Nations Interim Commission for the International Trade
Organization, at 84 § 18 (1948).
207. See infra Article 45(1)(a)(i) in APPENDIX, GENESIS OF ARTICLE XX(a)
GATT.
208. Report of Working Party No. 3 on Modifications to the General Agree-
ment, at 2, U.N. Doc. GATT/CP.2/22/Rev.1 (1948). See also infra Article
45(1)(a)(i) in APPENDIX, GENESIS OF ARTICLE XX(a) GATT.
209. Report of the Drafting Committee of the Preparatory Committee, U.N.
Conference on Trade and Employment, at 31, U.N. Doc. E/PC/T/34/Rev. 1 (May
29, 1947) See also New York Draft Charter, supra note 19, art. 37.
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price policy was covered by Article XX(a), as it was necessary to
protect public morals. 2 10 During the negotiations, the Norwe-
gian Delegation restated this view.211 Unfortunately, it is un-
clear whether the other delegates agreed with that
interpretation of "public morals" or whether they would have de-
fined this term more restrictively. The Norwegian Delegation
eventually withdrew its proposal during a later conference with-
out any further comment. 21 2 Thus, one could argue that "public
morals" were not intended to cover "the promotion of
temperance."2 13
In another example of a possible interpretation of "public
morals" in the drafting history, the Chinese delegate to the
Drafting Committee wanted to include an exception to justify
measures taken "to prevent, arrest, or relieve conditions of social
disturbance, natural calamity or other national emergencies." 2 14
Although this proposal was discussed in the Technical Sub-Com-
mittee,21 5 it was neither included in later drafts of the Excep-
tions Clause nor proposed for inclusion in the General
Agreement. 2 16
One could argue that this drafting history reveals that these
interpretations are not covered by the term "public morals."
210. The delegate additionally opined that Norway's measures should be
seen as justified under section (b). Report of the Drafting Committee of the Pre-
paratory Committee, supra note 209.
211. Report of the Second Session of the Preparatory Committee, U.N. Con-
ference on Trade and Employment, at 37, U.N. Doc. E/PC/T/189 (1947). See
also Geneva Draft Charter, supra note 20, art. 43.
212. Reports of the Third Committee: General Commercial Policy, U.N. Con-
ference on Trade and Development, at 24, U.N. Doc. E/CONF.2/C.3/1 (Dec. 2,
1947). See also Geneva Draft Charter, supra note 20, art. 43.
213. During a recent Panel proceeding the United States ignored this part of
Article XX's drafting history. Without any statement to refute this obvious as-
sumption, the U.S. claimed that the restrictions linked to a certain percentage
of beverages' alcohol content were necessary to "protect public morals." See Al-
coholic and Malt Beverages, supra note 48, § 3.125. Unfortunately, the Panel
failed to state its opinion towards the U.S. claim. See id. at § 5.70.
214. Report of the Preparatory Committee of the International Conference on
Trade and Development, Committee II, Technical Sub-Committee, at 11, U.N.
Doc. E/PC/T/C.II/50 (Nov. 13, 1946); Draft Report of the Technical Sub-Commit-
tee, at 35, U.N. Doc. E/PC/T/C.11/54 (Nov. 16, 1946).
215. Report of the Preparatory Committee of the International Conference on
Trade and Development, Committee II, at 2, U.N. Doc. E/PC/T/C.II/35 (Oct. 30,
1946).
216. See Reports of the Second Session of the Preparatory Committee, U.N.
Conference on Trade and Employment, Draft General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade, at 48, U.N. Doc. E/PC/T/189 (Aug. 30, 1947); Report of the Second Ses-
sion of the Preparatory Committee, U.N. Conference on Trade and Employment,
at 50, U.N. Doc. E/PC/T/186 (Sept. 10, 1947).
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Otherwise they would have either been included simultaneously
with the "public morals" exception in Article XX or withdrawn in
an early stage of the negotiations. 217 However, the evidence for
this assumption is based on the drafting history, which is, ac-
cording to Article 32 of the Vienna Convention, only a supple-
mentary tool of interpretation.
IV. CONCLUSION
Dispute proceedings within the World Trade Organization
have risen to a quasi-judicial level resembling the operations of
adjudicatory proceedings in national legal systems. Although
nations have developed extensive conventions to ensure consis-
tency in interpreting laws, the WTO judicial system has just be-
gun to develop similar judicial mechanisms to ensure uniform
and predictable treaty interpretations. The interpretation of Ar-
ticle XX(a) exemplifies the nascent stage of this legal order and
its limitations. To further develop this interpretative scheme,
the WTO panels must focus on substantive law by applying
"conventional" rules of treaty interpretation, rather than utiliz-
ing "extra-provisional" rules not linked to the provision's word-
ing, context, object or purpose.
The stability of the Dispute Settlement System is crucial to
the success of trade liberalization and the World Trade Organi-
zation. The WTO provides a suitable forum for the peaceful res-
olution of disputes through institutionalized and formalized
proceedings. The vastly increased number of dispute proceed-
ings calls, however, for uniform and reliable rules of interpreta-
tion based on and applied to the substantive law of GATT
provisions. If panels realize that such rules can guarantee con-
sistency and predictability within the Dispute Settlement Sys-
tem, the System can provide and enforce common solutions of
trade disputes in the transition to the next century.
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